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In response to a growing crisis in the thrift industry,1 Congress
enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
* Ms. Rubinstein is Counsel and Mesdms. Tucker and Meire are Associates in the Rich-
mond, Virginia office of Hunton & Williams. Each of the authors is a member of the Vir-
ginia Bar. Ms. Rubinstein also is a member of the Pennsylvania and D.C. Bars and Ms.
Tucker also is a member of the West Virginia Bar. The authors gratefully acknowledge the
assistance of Sarah S. Schimmels, who also is an associate in the Richmond office of Hunton
& Williams.
Authors' Note: The 102d Congress has pending before it several legisfative proposals
which, if enacted, would result in some restructuring of the current federal regulatory
scheme for banks and savings associations. Each of the current proposals would provide for
a single regulator of national banks and savings associations (in some of the proposals that
regulator would be a new federal banking regulator which would replace the current na-
tional bank and savings association regulators). In each case, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation would remain the insurer of the deposits for banks and savings associations,
and would be the receiver or conservator of such entities following the period, as described
in this article, in which the Resolution Trust Corporation is authorized to act as receiver or
conservator. It is difficult to predict whether any legislation will be adopted by this Congress
or, if any new legislation is adopted, the extent to which it would have a significant effect on
the receivership/conservatorship process described in this article.
1. The "thrift industry" has been described as including savings and loan associations,
savings banks and credit unions. Clark, Murtagh & Corcoran, Regulation of Savings As-
sociations Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, 45 Bus. LAw. 1013 n.2 (1990) [hereinafter Regulation of Savings Associations]. The
report accompanying the Senate's version of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act, S.774, defines thrifts as "savings and loans" and "savings banks." S.
REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. For purposes of
this article, "thrift industry" and "thrifts" will refer only to savings and loan associations
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ment Act of 1989 ("FIRREA" or "Act").2 The crisis was evidenced
by the failure of over 500 thrifts between 1980 and 1988-more
than three and one-half times as many in the previous forty-five
years combined. In 1988 alone, the Federal Savings and Loan In-
surance Corporation ("FSLIC," which prior to FIRREA insured
most of the thrift industry's deposits) merged or liquidated over
200 insolvent thrifts, and the U.S. Government's General Account-
ing Office ("GAO") estimated in 1989 that at least 338 additional
thrifts were insolvent as of December 31, 1988.' Despite the at-
tempted recapitalization of the FSLIC through enactment of the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,4 the insurance fund
held by FSLIC was inadequate to allow the FSLIC and the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB" or "Bank Board") 5 to close
these insolvent thrifts. As a result, these thrifts continued to oper-
ate and to incur massive losses.6
During the passage of FIRREA, Congress considered numerous
possible causes for the thrift crisis, including (1) loss of capital re-
sulting from the increase in interest rates in the late 1970s and
early 1980s; (2) forbearance and inadequate supervision by federal
regulators; (3) flaws in the process by which Congress and the reg-
ulators deregulated the thrift industry in the early 1980s; and (4)
purported inherent conflicts of interest between the FHLBB and
the FSLIC.7 While it did not determine which of these factors
and savings banks the deposits of which were insured by the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.
2. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA] (codified at scattered
provisions of Titles 12 and 15 U.S.C.A.).
3. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. In a 1981 case, the Illinois court noted that between
1941 and 1968 only five thrifts in the nation went into receivership. Telegraph Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862, 871 (N.D. III. 1981), aff'd on other grounds sub noma.
Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
992 (1983). While this number seems extraordinarily low, the thrift industry was largely
profitable from the 1930s through the 1960s. It was not until the 1970s and early 1980s that
the industry began to experience significant losses. See Regulation of Savings Associations,
supra note 1, at 1019-20. The Senate Report notes that "[a]lthough only 21 FSLIC-insured
institutions reported negative net worth under generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP") in June of 1981, by March 1988, the number had ballooned to 500 institutions."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
4. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987).
5. Before its abolishment by FIRREA, the FHLBB was responsible for administering the
FSLIC and was the primary federal regulator of federally-chartered thrifts.
6. See Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 1, at 1013-14.
7. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5. The FHLBB was responsible for chartering, ex-
amining and supervising federally-chartered thrifts. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988) (amended by
FIRREA). The FSLIC was responsible for examining and supervising all FSLIC-insured
thrifts. Id. §§ 1726(b), 1730(m) (1988) (repealed 1989). The conflict of interest between the
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caused the near failure of the industry, Congress attempted to
remedy the system's flaws in FIRREA.8 This Congressional intent
is reflected in the Act's "purposes clause," which states that FIR-
REA is intended to:
(i) promote a safe and stable system of affordable housing finance;
(ii) strengthen capital, accounting, and other supervisory stan-
dards to improve the supervision of savings associations;
(iii) curtail investments and other activities of savings associations
that pose unacceptable risks to the deposit insurance funds;
(iv) strengthen the enforcement powers of federal regulators of de-
pository institutions; and
(v) strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for de-
frauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their
depositors.9
Among other things, FIRREA restructured the thrift regulatory
scheme. It abolished the FHLBB and the FSLIC.' In place of the
FHLBB, Congress created the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") as the primary federal regulator of all federal and state
savings associations.11 Congress also amended the Federal Deposit
FHLBB and the FSLIC is described in the House Report which accompanied FIRREA:
The new structure created by [FIRREA] would eliminate the concentration of pow-
ers and overlapping functions that characterize the current Bank Board. The Bank
Board serves simultaneously as the chartering authority for Federal savings and loans
and as the industry's chief regulator. The Chairman of the Bank Board is also the
operating head of the [FSLIC]. Although the Bank Board controls the supervisory
machinery that oversees the thrift industry, it has delegated much of this responsibil-
ity to the presidents of the 12 [Federal Home Loan Banks]. The [Federal Home Loan
Bank] presidents, entrusted with the responsibility of examination and supervision,
are themselves elected directly by the industry-the very industry being examined
and supervised by the [Federal Home Loan Banks]. The [Federal Home Loan Banks]
also serve as a credit facility making loans to member institutions.
The system is rife with legal and real and potential conflicts of interest which com-
promise the integrity of the regulatory, insurance and credit functions of the Federal
Home Loan Bank System.
H.R. REP. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 424-25 (1989), reprinted in [1989] 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADUIN. NEws 86 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
8. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
9. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 note (West 1989); see also FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 101.
10. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 401(a)(1),(2); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988) (repealed
1989).
11. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). The OTS has all of the powers which
were vested in the FHLBB or its chairman on the day before enactment of the Act. Id. §
1462a(e). FIRREA also amended the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 to define "savings
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Insurance Act ("FDIA"),12 transferring to the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation ("FDIC") the FSLIC's responsibility of insur-
ing the deposits of savings associations.'3 The FDIC also is author-
ized under the Act to examine FDIC-insured savings associations, 4
to regulate certain of their activities' 5 and to take enforcement ac-
tion against such savings associations and certain of their
affiliates.'"
The Resolution Trust Corporation ("RTC") was created to man-
age and resolve most of the savings associations for which a conser-
vator or receiver was or is appointed for the period beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1989 and ending on August 9, 1992.17 All of the
responsibilities of the RTC are, however, actually performed by
the FDIC, and the board of directors of the FDIC also serves as
the board of directors of the RTC.'
In addition, Congress concluded that strong capital standards
association" to mean "a savings association, as defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, the deposits of which are insured by the [FDIC]." Id. § 1462(4). The Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, as amended by FIRREA, defines savings associations as including-
(1) "Federal savings associations" (any federal savings association or federal savings bank
chartered under section 5 of the Home Owners Loan Act); (2) "State savings associations"
(including building and loan associations, savings and loan associations, homestead associa-
tions and certain cooperative banks, each of which is chartered under and operating in ac-
cordance with the law of the state in which it is chartered or organized); and (3) any corpo-
ration (other than a bank) that the FDIC or the OTS jointly determine to be operating in
substantially the same manner as a savings association. Id. § 1813(b) (West 1989). The OTS
is, in addition, the federal regulator of savings institution holding companies. Id. § 1467a(b)
(West Cum. Supp. 1990). For purposes of this article, the term "savings association" will
have the same meaning as provided in FIRREA.
12. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1811 et seq. (West 1989).
13. Id. §§ 1814(a)(2), 1815. The FDIC also insures the deposits of commercial banks. Id. §
1814(a)(3).
14. Id. § 1820(b).
15. See, e.g. id. §§ 1828(m), 1831e, 1831f, 1831g.
16. Id. §§ 1818, 1828(m).
17. Id. § 1441a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). See also infra note 44 and accompanying text.
The Act also created the FSLIC Resolution Fund, which is to be managed by the FDIC. All
assets and liabilities of the FSLIC other than those transferred to the RTC were transferred
to the FSLIC Resolution Fund, including the assets and liabilities of thrifts for which the
FSLIC had been appointed receiver prior to January 1, 1989. Id. § 1821a (West 1989). The
FDIC succeeded the FSLIC as receiver or conservator of thrifts for which the FSLIC had
been appointed prior to January 1, 1989, and will serve as either receiver or conservator for
all savings associations placed into receivership or conservatorship by the OTS after August
9, 1992. FDIC v. Gillard, 740 F. Supp. 427, 428 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (in which the court con-
cluded that, while FIRREA is not a model of clarity on this point, this conclusion is sup-
ported by the extensive receivership powers given to the FDIC, as well as the anomalous
result of a contrary reading of FIRREA).
18. Id. §§ 1441a(b)(1)(C), 1441a(b)(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
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were essential to protect the safety of the deposit insurance system
and, critical of the capital forbearances permitted by the FHLBB,
provided a "benchmark" capital requirement in FIRREA below
which the OTS standards generally cannot fall. 9 FIRREA requires
that the OTS prescribe capital standards for savings associations
that are no less stringent than the capital standards applicable to
national banks, including a risk-based capital requirement, a lever-
age limit or ratio of not less than 3% of core capital to assets, and
a minimum level of tangible capital of not less than 1.5% of total
assets.20 The Act repealed the provision of existing law providing
for regulatory forbearances to capital-weak but otherwise solvent
institutions,2 but it nonetheless permits the OTS to exempt from
the sanctions which it may otherwise impose for noncompliance
with the capital standards those savings associations that meet cer-
tain requirements (provided that such exemptions pose no signifi-
cant risks to the savings association deposit insurance fund). To
quality for the exemption, a saving association must: (1) have com-
petent management, (2) be in substantial compliance with all other
applicable statutes, regulations and orders, and (3) have manage-
ment which has not engaged in activities jeopardizing the sound-
ness and safety of the association or impairing its capital. 2
After much debate, Congress also limited the amount of supervi-
sory goodwill that savings associations may include in calculating
regulatory capital.23 Supervisory goodwill represents a portion of
19. H.R. Res. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) reprinted in FED. BANtu L. REP. (CCH)
(Extra Ed. No. 1297, Aug. 14, 1989) at 406.
20. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(t) (West Cur. Supp. 1990). Core capital includes core capital as
defined by the Comptroller of the Currency ("Comptroller") for national banks, less any
unidentifiable intangible assets, plus certain mortgage servicing rights. Tangible capital is
core capital minus certain intangible assets. Id. § 1464(t)(9). FIRREA also specifies that all
regulations and policies of the OTS governing the safe and sound operation of savings as-
sociations, including those governing asset classifications and appraisals, be no less stringent
than the regulations and policies established by the Comptroller for national banks. Id. §
1463(c).
21. Id. § 1464(t)(10) (amended 1989). The amendment does not, however, require termi-
nation of existing capital recovery plans so long as the associations subject to such plans
continue to adhere to such plans and to submit regular progress reports to the OTS or the
FDIC. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 302; see also 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a note (West Cum. Supp.
1990).
22. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(t)(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). An association seeking an exemp-
tion also must file with the OTS an acceptable capital plan. Id. § 1464(t)(7)(D).
23. See id. § 1464(t)(9)(B); see also id. § 1464(t)(3)(A). The House debate on the Hyde
Amendment alone took up 18 pages in the Congressional Record for June 15, 1989. 135
CONG. REc. H2703 (daily ed. June 15, 1989). The Hyde Amendment, which was defeated by
the House, would have permitted the OTS to include supervisory goodwill in required capi-
1990]
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the consideration which thrifts acquiring failing or failed thrifts
often received from the FSLIC. The FSLIC treated supervisory
goodwill as a forbearance (generally equal to the amount by which
the acquired assets exceeded the acquiring thrift's liabilities) from
regulatory capital requirements. Goodwill generally is considered
to provide little capital support to an association because its value
is difficult to establish and because goodwill tends to decline dur-
ing periods of financial difficulty. 24 Under FIRREA, qualifying su-
pervisory goodwill in amounts ranging from 1.5% of total assets
through 1991 to .375% of total assets in 1994 may be included in
core capital.25 After 1994, supervisory goodwill may not be used to
satisfy a savings association's core capital requirement. 26 At the
time of FIRREA's passage, it was anticipated that approximately
250 savings associations would not be able to meet regulatory capi-
tal requirements because of FIRREA's limitations on the use of
supervisory goodwill.
In early 1991, the OTS reported that an estimated 240 savings
associations likely will fall short of the OTS capital standards, and
that another 276 capital-deficient savings associations currently are
operating under business plans approved by the OTS.25 Unless the
OTS has approved, and the savings association remains in compli-
tal if a savings association otherwise met its capital requirement and the association had "a
substantial claim that the exclusion of supervisory goodwill would violate either a contrac-
tual obligation of an agency of the United States or the Constitution." Id.
24. Regulations of Savings Associations, supra note 1, at 1044-45. The OTS's capital reg-
ulations issued pursuant to FIRREA define supervisory goodwill to mean goodwill resulting
from the acquisition, merger, consolidation, purchase of assets, or other business combina-
tion occurring on or before April 12, 1989 of (1) a savings association where the fair market
value of the assets acquired was less than the fair market value of the liabilities at the
acquisition date or (2) a problem institution. 12 C.F.R. § 567.1(ee) (1989). A problem insti-
tution, as defined by the OTS, is a savings association which at the time of its acquisition by
or with another savings association was subject to special regulatory controls or posed par-
ticular supervisory concerns to its regulators or failed to meet its regulatory capital require-
ment immediately before the transaction. Id. § 567.1(s).
25. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(t)(9)(B) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). "Qualifying" supervisory good-
will is the supervisory goodwill existing on August 12, 1989, amortized on a straightline basis
over the shorter of 20 years or the remaining period for amortization in effect on such date.
Id.
26. Id. § 1464(t)(3)(A).
27. See 135 CONG. REc. H2708 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Michel of Illi-
nois). Some of these affected savings associations have sought to enjoin the OTS from ap-
plying the FIRREA-based capital requirements to them. See cases cited infra note 104.
28. 241 More S&Ls Short of Capital Under '91 Rules, Am. Banker, Jan. 9, 1991, at 1, col.
1. The OTS did not indicate how many of those savings associations are capital-deficient
due to the limitations on the use of supervisory goodwill.
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ance with, an acceptable business plan,29 the failure to maintain
capital at or above the required minimum levels may be treated by
the OTS as an unsafe or unsound practice3" and may result in the
appointment of a receiver or conservator for the association.3 1 Still
other savings associations may fail for reasons other than insol-
vency or failure to meet the mandated regulatory capital
requirements.32
Since FIRREA's enactment, the RTC has assumed control over
some 500 failed savings associations in an estimated 38 states, and
the RTC presently owns more than 31,000 parcels of improved and
unimproved real estate.3 Because of the number of savings as-
sociations and the volume of assets under the RTC's control, law-
yers, creditors, borrowers and other financial institutions who are
dealing or have dealt with savings associations need to have an un-
derstanding of the receivership/conservatorship process.
This article is intended to be a practical guide to the receiver-
ship/conservatorship process and the methods by which the RTC
resolves failed savings associations. It is not intended, however, to
be an exhaustive analysis of the many issues that have arisen or
that may arise in the course of a savings association's receivership
or conservatorship. Part II of this article will describe how con-
servatorships and receiverships are commenced. Part III describes
the conservatorship and receivership powers of the RTC, and Part
IV discusses the RTC's liquidation and resolution process.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF CONSERVATORSHIPS AND RECEIVERSHIPS
A. Statutory Appointment Powers
As the primary federal regulator for savings associations, the
OTS, like the FHLBB before it, has the exclusive power to appoint
29. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(t)(6), (7) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
30. Id. § 1464(s)(3).
31. See infra text accompanying note 37. The FDIC also may temporarily suspend insur-
ance coverage if an insured savings association has insufficient capital. 12 U.S.C.A. §
1818(a)(8) (West 1989).
32. As will be discussed in Part II below, insolvency and inability to meet capital require-
ments are not the only criteria for placing a savings association into conservatorship or re-
ceivership. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
33. Saft, The Basics of FIRREA and the Resolution Trust Corporation, RnsL EST. FIN. J.
48 (Winter 1991).
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a receiver or conservator3 4 for a federal savings association.35 The
OTS may appoint a receiver or conservator ex parte, without a
hearing or notice,3 6 for a federal savings association if one or more
of the following conditions exist:
(i) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its
obligations to its creditors and others, including its members;
(ii) substantial dissipation of assets or earnings due to any viola-
tion or violations of law or regulations, or to any unsafe or unsound
practice or practices;
(iii) an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business, includ-
ing having substantially insufficient capital or otherwise;
(iv) willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become
final;
(v) concealment of books, papers, records, or assets of the savings
association or refusal to submit books, papers, records, or affairs of
the association for inspection to any examiner or to any lawful agent
of the [OTS];
(vi) the association is not likely to be able to meet the demands of
its depositors or pay its obligations in the normal course of business;
(vii) (I) the association has incurred or is likely to incur losses that
will deplete all or substantially all of its capital, and (II) there is no
reasonable prospect for the replenishment of the capital of the asso-
ciation without [flederal assistance; or
(viii) a violation or violations of laws or regulations, or an unsafe
or unsound practice or condition which is likely to cause insolvency
or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings, or is likely to weaken
the condition of the association or otherwise seriously prejudice the
interests of its depositors. 37
A receiver or conservator for a federal savings association also
may be appointed by the OTS, without any notice, hearing or
other action, if the savings association, by resolution of its board of
directors or of its members, consents to such appointment, if the
34. As discussed in Part III, a conservator is appointed to operate or dispose of an associ-
ation as a going concern. A receiver is appointed to liquidate the assets and windup the
affairs of a failed savings association. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
35. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(A).
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savings association is removed from membership in any Federal
Home Loan Bank or if the FDIC terminates the savings associa-
tion's status as an insured depository institution.s8
The OTS has the power to appoint a receiver or conservator for
an insured state savings association upon the existence of one or
more of the grounds enumerated in clauses (i) through (iii), (vii)
and (viii) above for federal savings associations s.3  The FDIC has
similar appointment powers, which extend both to state-chartered,
FDIC-insured banks and to FDIC-insured state savings
associations.40
The OTS cannot appoint a conservator or receiver for an insured
state savings association without the written approval of the asso-
ciation's state regulator. However, the OTS may proceed without
written approval after thirty days, provided it has responded in
writing to the state regulator's written reasons, if any, for with-
holding approval.41 On the other hand, the FDIC's power to ap-
point a receiver or conservator for a state savings association is
conditioned not upon the state regulator's consent but upon a find-
38. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(B). The board of directors or members of a savings association might
consent to such appointment in recognition that grounds exist for the appointment of, and
that the OTS is likely to appoint, a receiver or conservator for the association. A Federal
Home Loan Bank may remove a savings association from membership in such Bank if the
association (1) has failed to comply with the Federal Home Loan Bank Act or regulations
promulgated thereunder, (2) is insolvent or (3) has management or home-financing policies
inconsistent with sound and economical home financing or with the purposes of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Act. Id. § 1426(e). The FDIC may terminate a depository institution's
insured status on grounds similar to the grounds for appointment of a receiver or conserva-
tor. Id. § 1818(a)(2) (West 1989).
39. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(C) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
40. See id. § 1821(c)(5) (West 1989). As noted below, however, the FDIC may not exercise
its appointment powers with respect to a state-chartered depository institution unless the
institution's state regulatory authority has placed the institution into receivership or conser-
vatorship or has closed it. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Perhaps an oversight
by Congress, the FDIC has two additional grounds upon which to base the appointment of a
conservator or receiver that are not available to the OTS with respect to state savings as-
sociations. The FDIC also may appoint a conservator or receiver if (1) an association will-
fully violates a cease and desist order which has become final or (2) the association conceals
any books, papers, records or assets or refuses to submit such itemd or its affairs to examina-
tion by the OTS or the association's state regulator. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(5)(D),(E) (West
1989). FIRREA authorizes the OTS to examine all savings associations. Id. § 1463(a)(1)
(West Cum. Supp. 1990). In the course of any such examination, the OTS may examine the
books, records and documents of an association. Id. § 1464(d)(1)(B). The OTS also is em-
powered to issue cease and desist orders with respect to both federal and state savings as-
sociations. Id. § 1464(d)(1)(A). In view of such powers, it is unlikely that Congress would
have intentionally withheld these additional appointment grounds from the OTS.
41. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(D).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing by the FDIC either that: (1) a conservator, receiver or other
legal custodian has been appointed for a state savings association
for a period of at least fifteen days and that one or more depositors
is unable to withdraw any amount of any insured deposit, or (2)
the association has been closed by or under the laws of any state.42
Thus, the FDIC cannot independently determine to place a savings
association into receivership or conservatorship.
A savings association may contest the appointment of a receiver
or a conservator by the OTS or the FDIC by bringing an action
within thirty days after such appointment in the United States
district court in which the home office of the association is located
or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
The court must dismiss such action on the merits or direct the
OTS or the FDIC, as appropriate, to remove such appointee.48
The OTS must appoint the RTC as receiver in the case of any
savings association whose deposits were insured by the FSLIC
prior to enactment of FIRREA and for which a receiver or conser-
vator had been or is appointed during the period beginning Janu-
ary 1, 1989 and August 9, 1992. The FDIC must be appointed the
receiver by the OTS in all other cases. 44 Either the FDIC or the
RTC may serve as a conservator for a federal or state savings asso-
ciation.45 In the exercise of its appointment powers, the FDIC may
appoint itself to be the sole conservator or receiver of a failed state
savings association, except in the case of those savings associations
for which FIRREA mandates appointment of the RTC. 46
42. Id. § 1821(c)(4)(A) (West 1989). The FDIC must determine that one or more of the
grounds for appointment existed at the time the conservator or receiver was appointed or at
the time the association was closed, or exist at any time during such appointment or closure.
Id. § 1821(c)(4)(B). The FDIC also has the discretion to accept an appointment as receiver
or conservator when such appointment is tendered by a state regulator. Id. § 1821(e)(4)(A).
43. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 1821(c)(7) (West 1989).
44. Id. § 1464(d)(2)(H)(iii) (West Cure. Supp. 1990); see also Gail & Norton, A Decade's
Journey from "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation:" The Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAW. 1103, 1134 (1990) (RTC must
be appointed "prior to August 9, 1992"); Regulation of Savings Associations, supra note 1,
at 1024 (RTC must be appointed receiver or conservator between January 1, 1989 and Au-
gust 9, 1992).
45. Although the statute does not expressly authorize the OTS to appoint a third party to
serve as a conservator, the statute's use of the word "may" in respect of conservatorship
appointments in contrast to the use of the word "must" when specifying a receiver, suggests
that the OTS may appoint a person other than the FDIC or the RTC to serve as a conserva-
tor. Compare the first sentence of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(H)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990)
with the second sentence of the same section.
46. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(6) (West 1989).
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Completing the statutory scheme, FIRREA provides that, except
for judicial review of the appointment of a receiver or conservator,
no court may take any action to remove any conservator or re-
ceiver. Moreover, a court may not restrain or affect the exercise of
the powers or functions of any conservator or receiver except at the
request of the OTS or the FDIC, as the case may be.47
B. Judicial Interpretations
There have been few cases interpreting the appointment powers
of the FDIC and the OTS as set forth in the Act.48 However, since
FIRREA generally preserves the pre-FIRREA receivership and
conservatorship appointment powers of the FHLBB and the
FSLIC,49 the judicial interpretations of the pre-FIRREA appoint-
ment powers remain valid precedent and are instructive when con-
sidering whether to take any action challenging a conservatorship
or receivership appointment.
1. Due Process
FIRREA carries forward the existing statutory scheme of the
Home Owners Loan Act of 193350 ("HOLA") and the National
Housing Act of 1934,51 which permitted the appointment of a re-
ceiver or conservator ex parte, without prior notice and hearing,
but authorized subsequent judicial review at the request of the af-
fected savings association. The constitutionality of the ex parte na-
ture of the appointment process has been addressed many times.
In the earliest case in which a thrift challenged the scheme as a
seizure of the thrift without due process of law in violation of the
47. Id. § 1821(j); id. § 1464(d)(2)(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
48. As of September 11, 1990, approximately 20 lawsuits had been filed in the federal
courts by savings associations against the OTS challenging FIRREA's limits on the capital
treatment of supervisory goodwill, deferred loan losses and other forbearances and, as a
consequence, the OTS's ability to place such associations into receivership or conservator-
ship. Judge Dismisses Challenge to Capital Rule on Goodwill, Am. Banker, September 11,
1990, at 2, col. 3. See also infra note 104 and accompanying text. Several of the cases are on
appeal, and it is expected that the issues will be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. OTS
Suffers Major Setback on Supervisory Goodwill, The Thrift Regulator, February 8, 1991, at
2, col. 2.
49. See infra notes 50, 51, 56 and accompanying text.
50. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1990) (amending 12 U.S.C. §
1464(d)(6) (1988)).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1729(c)(3) (1988) (repealed 1989) (which incorporated by reference the
provisions of § 1464(d)).
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United States Constitution,52 Fahey v. Mallonee,53 the Supreme
Court held that there was no constitutional requirement that an
association be given an adjudicatory hearing prior to the FHLBB's
appointment of a conservator. In Fahey, the Supreme Court con-
strued section 5(d) of the HOLA as enacted in 1933, which simply
authorized the FHLBB to prescribe by regulation the terms and
conditions upon which a conservator or receiver could be ap-
pointed. The FHLBB's regulations contained grounds resembling
those set forth in FIRREA (and the pre-FIRREA statutory
scheme) and provided for ex parte appointment and a post-ap-
pointment administrative hearing. In reviewing the regulations, the
Court noted that the grounds for appointment of a receiver or con-
servator "are the usual and conventional grounds found in most
state and federal banking statutes. ' 54 In upholding the statutory
scheme, the Court held that the post-possession hearing is a dras-
tic procedure:
[b]ut the delicate nature of the institution and the impossibility of
preserving credit during an investigation has made it an almost in-
variable custom to apply supervisory authority in this summary
manner. It is a heavy responsibility to be exercised with disinterest-
edness and restraint, but in light of the history and customs of
banking we cannot say it is unconstitutional.5
Since Fahey, the ex parte nature of the appointment powers of
FIRREA and its predecessor statutes have been consistently up-
held on the grounds that the government's interest in preserving
depositor confidence and minimizing loss to the insurance fund
outweigh the interests of the association. 6 Consequently, the post-
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
53. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
54. Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 253-54 (footnote omitted).
56. See Haralson v. FHLBB, 837 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d
1400 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS,
742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990); Shemonsky v. Director, OTS, 733 F. Supp. 892 (M.D.
Penn. 1990); Haralson v. FHLBB, 721 F. Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1989); First Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988 (D. Haw. 1982). In Woods v. FHLBB, the
Fifth Circuit observed that:
The government interest in this case is obvious. Savings and loan associations de-
rive the principal part of their fiscal strength from FSLIC insurance. Without this
insurance, associations would be unable to secure the guarantee of the government for
individual deposits. With the deposits this security attracts, institutions make invest-
ments, acquire property, and extend loans. The risk of failure with respect to these
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deprivation court review generally satisfies due process
requirements.
2. Standard of Review
FIRREA does not define the scope of the district courts' review
of 'the regulators' action in appointing a receiver or conservator,
but merely provides, like the predecessor statutes, that the court
"shall upon the merits dismiss [the action contesting the appoint-
ment] or direct the [OTS or the FDIC] to remove such conservator
or receiver. '57 Most of the cases involving a challenge to the ap-
pointment of a conservator or receiver discuss the applicable stan-
dard of review. While not unanimous, the prevailing view is that
the statutes do not provide for de novo review, but instead require
the court to uphold an appointment decision unless the OTS or its
predecessor acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, a court will review the administrative rec-
ord and determine whether one or more of the statutory grounds
for appointment existed at the time of such appointment. If one or
more of the grounds relied upon by the regulator in fact existed at
such time, then the court's inquiry must end and the appointment
must be upheld. Thus, a savings association generally will have
transactions falls most heavily upon the FSLIC as insurer. Congress thus granted the
Bank Board and the FSLIC the strongest powers constitutionally possible in order to
preserve depositor confidence in the savings institutions of this country and to mini-
mize loss and depletion of FSLIC insurance funds.
Woods' and Western's private interests are obviously subordinate to those of the
government. When Woods acquired Western, he was aware of the extensive regula-
tory system and the possibility of continuous, in-depth supervision by Bank Board
examiners. He had to know this supervision would be acute in the case of an institu-
tion which increased its assets from approximately $34 million to almost $2 billion in
a period of just over four years .... While plaintiffs' interests cannot be destroyed
by arbitrary or capricious actions, the process that is due is to be assayed by consider-
ations which account for all interests in their context.
The method provided-a court review of agency action under the arbitrary or ca-
pricious standard-is adequate to assure against the risk of mistaken deprivations. If
the record before the Bank Board is properly compiled and demonstrates it properly
followed its Congressional mandate and its own regulations, and gave fair and rea-
soned consideration to all relevant factors before determining that one or more of the
statutory grounds for appointment of a receiver existed, its decision will survive re-
view in the district court. That congressionally provided standard of review is all the
process an FSLIC-insured savings and loan association and its owners are constitu-
tionally due in this case.
826 F.2d at 1411-12.
57. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987); Guaranty Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986); Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB,
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the burden of proving that the regulator's decisions to appoint a
receiver or conservator was arbitrary and capricious. In addition,
the association must overcome a presumption of regularity the
courts afford the regulators' decisions regarding receivership/con-
servatorship appointments."9
3. Jurisdiction
Any challenge by a savings association to the appointment of a
receiver or conservator must be brought within thirty days of such
appointment.6 0 The analogous pre-FIRREA provision of the
HOLA has been construed by the courts to be a jurisdictional re-
quirement.6' Thus, if a savings association fails to contest an ap-
pointment within the thirty-day period following such appoint-
ment, a court may no longer have jurisdiction to review the
appointment of the receiver or conservator.
Moreover, courts have examined the relationship between the
thirty-day post-deprivation judicial review and the provision which
782 F.2d 490 (5th Cir.), modified, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986); Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. FHLBB, 720 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984); Lincoln
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990); Haralson v. FHLBB, 721 F.
Supp. 1344 (D.D.C. 1989); San Marino Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. 502 (C.D.
Cal. 1984); Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343 (N.D. Ohio
1981) (containing an extensive discussion of what should be included in the administrative
record); Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 162 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Wis. 1958), aff'd
in part, dismissed in part, 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959).
Several cases purport to require a de novo (that is, a full adversarial and evidentiary)
hearing. See, e.g., Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (rejects arbi-
trary and capricious standard; "upon the merits" means that the association must have had
a meaningful opportunity to make a case in opposition to the appointment at some point in
the process leading to the appointment and the FHLBB must be able to show a reasonable
factual basis for its action); Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 540 F. Supp. 1374 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) ("on the merits" means more in the nature of de novo than appellate review),
rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983);
Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FSLIC, 564 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. IlM. 1981) (full adversarial
hearing "on the merits" required as to FHLBB's authority to appoint receiver), a/I'd on
other grounds sub nom. Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). The court in Woods v. FHLBB argued, however, that only
the Collie and Telegraph courts actually applied a de novo standard. Woods v. FHLBB, 826
F.2d at 1407.
59. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d at 1408-09; Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 794 F.2d at 1342.
60. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (West Cure. Supp. 1990); see also supra text accompany-
ing note 43.
61. See, e.g., Womble v. Dixon, 585 F. Supp. 728, 733 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd in part, va-
cated in part, 752 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1984); First Say. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 995 (D. Haw. 1982).
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precludes judicial review except with respect to the appointment of
a receiver or conservator.6 2 Aside from reviewing the appointment
of a receiver or conservator, courts have concluded that they have
no jurisdiction to take any action restraining or affecting the exer-
cise of the powers of a receiver or conservator.6 3 On that basis, one
court refused to enjoin a conservator from liquidating the assets of
an association during the pendency of litigation contesting the con-
servator's appointment. 4 Another court denied, on the same basis,
the claims of members, directors and officers of an association for
monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief unrelated
to the association's contest of the receivership appointment. 5 Still
another court refused to compel the RTC to answer interrogatories
and to produce documents identifying the grounds for its appoint-
ment as receiver in a case brought by the RTC against the obligors
on notes held by it as receiver.6
C. Grounds for Appointment
FIRREA generally preserves the pre-FIRREA appointment
grounds available to the FHLBB and the FSLIC (although trans-
ferring such powers to the OTS and the FDIC). Importantly,
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A), (C) (1988). Although these provisions were amended in
1989 by FIRREA, the identical provisions are continued as 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(5)(E),(G)
(West Cum. Supp. 1990).
63. See, e.g., Haralson v. FHLBB, 837 F.2d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Shemonsky v.
OTS, 733 F. Supp. at 892, 894 (M.D. Penn. 1990) (court lacks jurisdiction to grant injunc-
tive relief against enforcement of a receivership order not challenged under Section 301 of
FIRREA (12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(5)(E) (West Cum. Supp. 1990)); First Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. 988, 994 (D. Haw. 1982) ("it can be said without
any fear of dispute that Section 1464(d)(6)(C) of Title 12 complements 12 U.S.C. §
1464(d)(6)(A) and makes it absolutely clear that no suit can be entertained and no relief
affecting the powers and functions of a receiver may be sought or accorded other than under
the provisions of § 1464(d)(6)(A) of Title 12"). But cf. Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. OTS, 742 F.
Supp. 1089, 1124 (D. Kan. 1990) (court's power to issue restraining orders is statutorily
limited by § 1464(d)(6)(C), which prohibits court from taking action to restrain or affect the
exercise of the receiver's power and functions).
64. Haralson, 837 F.2d at 1126.
65. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 547 F. Supp. at 994.
66. RTC v. Commerce Partners, 132 F.R.D. 443 (W.D. La. 1990).
67. The HOLA authorized the FHLBB to appoint a receiver or conservator for a feder-
ally-chartered thrift upon the following grounds:
(i) insolvency in that the assets of the association are less than its obligations to its
creditors and others, including its members; (ii) substantial dissipation of assets or
earnings due to any violation or violations of law, rules, or regulations, or to any
unsafe or unsound practice or practices; (iii) an unsafe or unsound condition to trans-
act business; (iv) willful violation of a cease-and-desist order which has become final;
(v) concealment of books, papers, records, or assets of the association or refusal to
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however, the appointment grounds for the first time expressly pro-
vide that the OTS and the FDIC may consider whether the savings
association's capital is substantially insufficient or whether it can
pay its debts or obligations as they become due. The new provi-
sions reflect Congress's belief that the ability to consider such fac-
tors enables the regulators to intervene prior to a savings associa-
tion's insolvency. In this way the regulators may act quickly and
decisively in a situation where a savings association experiences a
liquidity crisis, thereby preserving the resources of the insurance
funds.68 In addition, FIRREA added the last two grounds listed in
Part A above, which also have the effect of permitting the regula-
tors to intervene prior to actual insolvency.
Thrifts have litigated appointments based on the first three
grounds (insolvency, dissipation of assets or earnings and unsound
or unsound condition) for which receivers and conservators may be
appointed. The holdings in these cases, which for the most part
pre-date FIRREA, nonetheless show how the OTS and the courts
may interpret these specific grounds for appointment.6 9 The five
remaining grounds have not, as yet, been the subject of significant
reported litigation and will not be discussed further in this
article.70
submit books, papers, records, or affairs of the association for inspection to any exam-
iner or to any lawful agent of the Board.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(A) (1988) (amended 1989). The National Housing Act of 1934 au-
thorized the FSLIC to appoint a receiver or conservator for a state-chartered thrift on the
same grounds by incorporating by reference § 1464(d)(6)(A). Id. § 1729(c)(3) (1988) (re-
pealed 1989).
68. The HOLA provided for the appointment of a receiver or conservator where the asso-
ciation was in "an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business." 12 U.S.C. §
1464(d)(6)(A)(iii) (1988) (amended 1989). As amended by FIRREA, the clause "including
having substantially insufficient capital or otherwise" now appears at the end of this ground.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(A)(iii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). The House Report suggests, how-
ever, that at least the House Banking Committee intended to authorize appointment of a
receiver or conservator only when the regulator determines that a lack of liquidity consti-
tutes an unsafe or unsound condition. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 428 ("the Committee
believes that it is essential that the appropriate Federal banking agencies have clear author-
ity to determine when conditions such as . . . lack of liquidity constitute an unsafe and
unsound condition").
69. The Act requires that only one ground for receivership need be shown by the OTS or
the FDIC. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. The analogous pre-FIRREA law was
construed narrowly to require the courts to confirm whether or not the grounds specified by
the Bank Board in the notice of receivership existed. The Bank Board was not permitted in
court to justify its decision on ad hoc rationalizations. Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 564 F. Supp. 862, 877 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd on other grounds, sub. nom. Telegraph
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983).
70. In Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990), the OTS
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1. Insolvency
Insolvency has long been a ground for which receivers and con-
servators could be appointed for thrifts, 7' and it is the ground most
commonly thought of as the basis for such an appointment. How-
ever, there has been little case law involving this appointment pro-
vision of FIRREA and its predecessor statutes even though such
statutes provide little guidance as to what constitutes insolvency.
The relevant provisions of FIRREA and the pre-FIRREA stat-
utes provide that a savings association is insolvent when its assets
"are less than its obligations to its creditors and others, including
members. '7 12 The statutory scheme neither defines obligations nor
explains how assets are to be valued. The FHLBB consistently
computed insolvency by the book net worth method based on the
monthly reports required to be filed by thrifts. 3 This method of
valuing an institution was found to be valid under the HOLA's ap-
pointment provision.74 In so doing, courts have rejected arguments
that assets must be valued at fair market value and that obliga-
tions include only currently due liabilities,75 and have upheld the
loan loss reserves that were calculated by the FHLBB and de-
based its appointment of a conservator for Franklin on the three grounds enumerated as
subparagraphs (iii), (vii) and (viii) above. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The
court simply concluded that the association had not engaged in any unsafe or unsound prac-
tices and, therefore, that the OTS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in appointing the
conservator. See generally infra note 96 and accompanying text. Because the court did not
discuss the applicability of the grounds (vii) and (viii), further discussion of these grounds
would not be helpful.
71. This ground, along with the two grounds discussed in more detail below and the con-
cealment of books and records from the regulators, were among the grounds for appoint-
ment of a conservator or receiver in regulations of the FHLBB appearing in the first edition
of the Code of Federal Regulations. 24 C.F.R. § 204.3 (1939).
72. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(A)(i) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 1821(c)(5)(A) (West
1989); see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(A)(i) (amended 1989), 1729(c)(1)(B)(i)(I) and (2)(B)
(1988) (repealed 1989).
73. Telegraph Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019, 1027 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 992 (1983). According to the book net worth method, an association's value is mea-
sured by the association's outstanding liabilities subtracted from its assets valued at book
value. Id.
74. Id.; see also Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339, 1345 (8th Cir.
1986); Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1154 (W.D. Ill. 1986) ("as a matter of law the
[Bank] Board defines insolvency and the accounting methods used to determine insol-
vency"). But cf. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 919 (D.D.C. 1990)
(where the court noted that an appraisal of assets by the conservator after its appointment
supported the FHLBB's finding of insolvency). While book value generally is a historical
value, an appraisal usually establishes the current value of an asset.
75. See Telegraph Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d at 1027.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ducted by it from an association's net worth to evaluate its
insolvency.76
These cases as a whole demonstrate judicial deference to the reg-
ulator's methodology for calculating insolvency. It should be noted,
however, that courts also have rejected the argument that the in-
solvency of an association must always be established prior to the
appointment of a conservator or receiver, since insolvency is but
one of the grounds specified in the statutory scheme."
2. Substantial Dissipation of Assets
The second ground for appointment, substantial dissipation of
assets or earnings due to violations of laws or regulations or unsafe
or unsound practices, was a part of pre-FIRREA law and, as noted
above, continues to be a ground under FIRREA.7s While few courts
have articulated a standard for what constitutes "substantial dis-
sipation" of assets, one court has suggested, without elaboration,
that substantial dissipation occurs when an association's "assets or
earnings have been adversely affected to a significant degree as a
result of such a violation or unsound practice.'79
Similarly, there is no clearly articulated standard for what con-
stitutes an "unsafe or unsound practice." The legislative history of
the FHLBB's cease and desist powers, which also incorporated an
unsafe or unsound practices standard,8 0 contains the following defi-
nition of "unsafe or unsound practice:"
76. See, e.g., Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d at 1345; Collie v. FHLBB,
642 F. Supp. at 1153-54.
77. See, e.g., Alliance Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d 490, 496 (5th Cir.),
modified, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986) ("such a construction of § 1464(d)(6)(A) would render
its subsections (ii) through (v) mere excess verbiage, a result which we refuse to reach");
Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 162.F. Supp. 350, 353 (E.D. Wis. 1958), aff'd in
part, dismissed in part 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959) ("neither
the statute nor common sense makes insolvency a prerequisite to action") (construing an
earlier version of 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(2) which authorized the FHLBB to appoint a supervi-
sory representative in charge if a ground for appointment of a receiver or conservator
existed).
78. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(6)(A)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 1821(c)(5)(B) (West
1989).
79. Haralson v. FHLBB, 721 F. Supp. 1344, 1354 (D.D.C. 1989).
80. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(2)(A) (1988) (amended 1989). This section, amended in 1989, gave
the FHLBB the power to issue cease and desist orders whenever it determined that an
association was engaging in an unsafe or unsound practice or violating laws or regulations in
conducting its business.
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Generally speaking, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any
action or lack of action, which is contrary to generally accepted stan-
dards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if
continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an institu-
tion, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance
funds."'
Some courts have interpreted this legislative history to limit the
"unsafe or unsound practice" provision of the FHLBB's cease and
desist powers to those practices which could have a reasonably di-
rect effect on an association's financial condition.82 One of these
courts also discussed the FHLBB's power to issue cease and desist
orders based on violations of law. The court noted that neither the
statute nor the legislative history explained which laws, if violated,
would have permitted the FHLBB to exercise its cease and desist
power. The court suggested, but did not decide, that violations of
law may well be subject to the same judicial limitation imposed on
the FHLBB's cease and desist powers based on unsafe and un-
sound practices (that is, violations of law which directly affect an
association's financial condition).8 3
Although these cases do not arise in the context of appointment
powers, the cease and desist powers and the appointment powers
represent different points on the continuum of powers available to
81. 122 CONG. REC. 26474 (1966) (citing to a memorandum of John Home, then chairman
of the FHLBB) (cited with approval by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in MCorp Finan-
cial, Inc. v. Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d 852, 863 (5th Cir. 1990)
and in Gulf Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (in which the court refers to the statement as the "authorita-
tive definition" of "unsafe or unsound practice")). In MCorp, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that MCorp's failure to transfer assets to its troubled subsidiary bank was not, as the Fed-
eral Reserve Board had argued, an unsafe or unsound practice under the Bank Holding
Company Act. In Gulf, the court held that a savings association's policy of calculating per
diem interest by a method differing from the method recited in its contracts did not consti-
tute an unsafe or unsound practice warranting issuance of a cease and desist order by the
FHLBB.
82. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d at 264, 265 (citing remarks of Rep.
Wright Patman at 112 CONG. REC. 24984 (1966)). See Northwest Nat'l Bank, Fayetteville,
Arkansas v. OCC, 917 F.2d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 1990) (unsafe and unsound banking prac-
tices are defined as "conduct deemed contrary to accepted standards of banking operations
which might result in abnormal risk or loss to a banking institution or shareholders" (cita-
tions omitted)). In Northwest, the court refused to set aside a cease and desist order issued
by the Comptroller as a result of unsafe and unsound practices engaged in by the bank. See
also Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1089, 1126 (discussed infra at note
96 and accompanying text).
83. Gulf Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d at 265; see also note 5 and accom-
panying text.
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the federal banking regulators to address unsafe and unsound
practices and violations of law. What constitutes unsafe or un-
sound practices or violations of law should not vary with the power
sought to be exercised, although a more stringent test-whether
such activity results in a substantial dissipation of assets-must be
passed before the OTS or the FDIC may take the more drastic step
of appointing a receiver or conservator. "
With those imprecise standards in mind, it is helpful to review
the activities cited by the courts which have upheld receivership
and conservatorship appointments on this ground. Those cases
generally recite fact patterns including some combination of the
following activities: making loans in repeated violation of FHLBB
or FSLIC regulations; 5 funding loans with brokered or jumbo cer-
tificates of deposit having high interest rates;s6 having an undue
concentration of loans in high-risk categories;87 having inadequate
loan underwriting policies and procedures;8 underwriting specula-
tive or imprudent loans;89 repeated violations of cease and desist
84. See Washington Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. 343, 392 (N.D. Ohio
1981).
85. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d 1400, 1409-10 (5th Cir. 1987) (repeated viola-
tions of appraisal regulations, loans-to-one-borrower regulations, growth regulations and
regulations restricting transactions with affiliates); Haralson v. FHLBB, 721 F. Supp. 1344,
1354 (D.D.C. 1989) (violation of regulations concerning loan underwriting standards, ap-
praisals and loans-to-one-borrower); Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (violations of loans-to-one-borrower and appraisal regulations); San Marino Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. 502, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (repeated violations of loans-
to-one-borrower regulations). Among these cases, violations of the loans-to-one-borrower
and appraisal regulations were the most frequently cited activity.
86. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d at 1409; Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 794 F.2d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1986); Alliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB,
782 F.2d 490, 494-95, modified, 790 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1986). But cf. Washington Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. at 392 (violation of regulation limiting outside borrow-
ings by thrifts could be the basis for appointment of a receiver, but the FHLBB did not
show that a violation of the regulation resulted in substantial dissipation of the thrift's
assets).
87. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d at 1409 (high risk categories include acquisition,
development and construction loans).
88. Id. (failure to require sufficient financial information to evaluate borrowers' repay-
ment abilities); see also Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d at 1343 (lack of
formal business objectives, plans and policies, including sound management policies); Alli-
ance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d at 494-95 (inadequate underwriting proce-
dures and failure to verify borrowers' abilities to repay).
89. See, e.g., Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d at 1343 (large, speculative
loans with the lender assuming all risk); Alliance Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782
F.2d at 494 (speculative, imprudent loans).
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orders or regulatory warnings;90 and appraisal91 and loan loss re-
serve deficiencies. 9 2 In contrast, the FHLBB failed to show that an
association's "pledge of approximately $60 million [of its assets as]
collateral pursuant to mark to market agreements" and "engaging
in standby commitments" constituted a dissipation of assets.9 3
This resulted in the court returning control of the association to its
former shareholders.
3. Unsafe or Unsound Condition to Transact Business
As in the case of the first two grounds for appointment (insol-
vency and substantial dissipation of assets) the third ground, an
unsafe or unsound condition to transact business, is carried for-
ward from pre-FIRREA law.9 4 It is difficult to determine precisely
the circumstances in which the regulators will apply this ground,
since two other grounds also incorporate the concept of unsafe or
unsound practices.95 In addition, there have been few cases in
which a receivership or conservatorship appointment rests on an
unsafe or unsound condition to transact business.
One court faced with confirming the OTS's appointment of a
conservator based upon this ground simply reconfirmed that an
unsafe or unsound practice such as would permit the appointment
of a conservator or receiver must be limited to those practices
which have a reasonably direct effect on the savings association's
financial condition. That court disagreed with the OTS's assertion
that certain of the savings association's accounting techniques con-
stituted unsafe and unsound practices and concluded that the OTS
90. See, e.g., Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d at 1409; San Marino Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 605 F. Supp. at 509; Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. at 1153.
91. See, e.g., Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 794 F.2d at 1343; Alliance Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 782 F.2d at 495; San Marino Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 605 F.
Supp. at 509.
92. See, e.g., Collie v. FHLBB, 642 F. Supp. at 1153.
93. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. at 393 (the court none-
theless upheld the appointment on the basis that the thrift was in an unsafe and unsound
condition).
94. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (6)(A)(iii) (1988) (amended 1989); 12 U.S.C.A. §
1464(d)(2)(A)(iii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 1821(c)(5)(iii) (West 1989).
95. The other two grounds are: (1) substantial dissipation of assets due to unsafe or un-
sound practice or practices (discussed above) (12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(A)(ii) (West Cum.
Supp. 1990); id. 1821(c)(5)(B) (West 1989)); and (2) an unsafe or unsound practice or condi-
tion which is likely to cause insolvency or substantial dissipation of assets or earnings, or to
weaken the condition of the association or seriously jeopardize its depositors' interests (id. §
1464(d)(2)(A)(viii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); id. § 1821(c)(5)(H) (West 1989)). The latter
ground was added by FIRREA. There has been one reported case in which the latter ground
has been utilized by the OTS as the basis for appointment of a receiver or conservator, but
the court did not explain this ground. See supra note 70.
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had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in appointing a conserva-
tor.9 6 Another court, however, construed this appointment ground
somewhat differently:
An association is in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact busi-
ness ... when it is in a weakened financial condition and is con-
trolled by individuals or management who have engaged in a pattern
of regulatory violations or unsafe and unsound practices and who
are unwilling or unable to conform to applicable rules or regulations,
supervisory directives or safe and sound practices."
Applying that rationale, the court found that repeated insider
transactions, together with the modification and extension of prob-
lem loans and the lack of confidence in the association's manage-
ment, supported the FHLBB's determination that the association
was in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business."s
Other cases support the notion that a principal focus of the third
ground, although not found in its express language, is pervasive
misconduct by the association's management. Thus, this ground
was applied by the FHLBB and the OTS where management had
engaged in interrelated unsafe, unsound, or unlawful transactions
designed to finance the business interests of, and had diverted the
association's assets to, the association's directors and their affili-
ates, and where management was found to be unsafe or unfit to
manage the association. 9 It also has been applied where the associ-
ation engaged in repeated imprudent transactions designed to im-
properly upstream monies to the association's parent, in effect
"looting" the association, 00 and where imprudent practices per-
96. Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Kan. 1990). On appeal by
the OTS, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 6, 1990 stayed the district
court's order overturning the conservatorship appointment. Director, OTS v. Franklin Sav.
Ass'n, No. 90-3272, slip op. (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 1990).
97. Haralson v. FHLBB, 721 F. Supp. 1344, 1354 (D.D.C. 1989) (citation omitted).
98. Id. at 1344.
99. Beacon Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. FHLBB, 162 F. Supp. 350, 362-63 (E.D. Wis. 1958),
afl'd in part, dismissed in part, 266 F.2d 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 823 (1959).
100. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901 (D.D.C. 1990). In Lincoln, the
OTS first appointed a conservator for the association after it concluded that the association
was in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business and that a substantial dissipa-
tion of its assets had occurred. The OTS later appointed a receiver after determining that
Lincoln also was insolvent. On judicial review of the appointments, the court concluded
without discussion that the association was in an unsafe or unsound condition to transact
business. Id. at 906. The court also found that a tax-sharing agreement between Lincoln and
its parent association, as well as bogus transactions designed to justify payments by Lincoln
under that agreement, constituted unsafe or unsound practices which resulted in substantial
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sisted over a four-year period despite numerous regulatory warn-
ings, supervisory actions and cease and desist orders. 1' 1
As noted elsewhere in this article, FIRREA amended this ap-
pointment ground to expressly provide that insufficient capital
constitutes an unsafe or unsound condition to transact business. °2
A number of associations have entered into agreements with the
FHLBB that permit the associations to include supervisory good-
will resulting from acquisitions of failing thrifts when calculating
the associations' regulatory capital.'0 " Fearing that FIRREA's limi-
tation on the utilization of supervisory goodwill and the associa-
tions' resulting failure to meet the regulatory capital requirements
would lead to the appointment of a receiver or conservator, some
of these associations have asked the federal courts to enjoin the
OTS from appointing conservators or receivers on the basis of in-
sufficient capital.10 Several cases have denied the requested relief
based on jurisdiction or procedural grounds. 10 5 However, in a grow-
ing number of cases, courts have agreed with the associations, as-
sertions that FIRREA .did not abrogate their contracts with the
FHLBB and that the OTS remains bound by these contracts. 06 It
dissipation of Lincoln's assets. Id. at 910-11.
101. Woods v. FHLBB, 826 F.2d at 1410. But see Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
FHLBB, 526 F. Supp. at 387-88 (the association's inability to pay certain obligations due on
the date of the receiver's appointment supported the FHBB's receivership appointment on
this ground).
102. See supra text accompanying note 68.
103. For a discussion of what constitutes supervisory goodwill, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 23-26.
104. See, e.g., Far West Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Director, OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Ore.
1990); Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. OTS, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11760 (D.D.C. Sept.
7, 1990); Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1159 (M.D. Ga. 1990);
Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (Ct. Cl. 1990); El Paso Sav. Ass'n v. Director,
OTS, No. EP-89-CA-426-H, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990); Flagship Fed. Say. Bank v.
Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
105. Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. OTS, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11760 (D.D.C. Sept.
7, 1990) (only the U.S. Claims Court has jurisdiction over breach of contract actions against
the United States); Flagship Fed. Sav. Bank v. Wall, 748 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Cal. 1989)
(court has jurisdiction, but OTS and FDIC letters directing Flagship to comply with the
capital requirements, identifying the regulations the association may be in violation of, and
the actions it could take, do not represent formal determinations of either agency; thus, the
controversy is not ripe for review); El Paso Say. Ass'n v. Director, OTS, No. EP-89-CA-426-
H, slip op. (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990) (association must exhaust its administrative remedies
before seeking injunction against OTS).
106. See e.g., Far West Fed. Bank, S.B. v. Director, OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Ore.
1990) (FIRREA did not abrogate preexisting contract granting capital forbearances, and
attempted repudiation of contract constitutes an unconstitutional taking of the association's
property interests); Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Director, OTS, 742 F. Supp. 1159 (M.D.
Ga. 1990) (OTS is bound by conversion agreement between association and FHLBB which
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is anticipated that this issue will be resolved by the federal appel-
late courts.
III. CONSERVATORSHIP AND RECEIVERSHIP POWERS
A. Powers Generally
The powers of a conservator or receiver over failed federally-in-
sured depository institutions are set forth primarily in sections 11,
12, and 13 of the FDIA.10 7 Although the sections expressly convey
authority only to the FDIC, the RTC is given corresponding pow-
ers over those savings associations for which it acts as conservator
or receiver. 08
The conservator or receiver for a failed savings association suc-
ceeds by operation of law to all rights, title, powers, and privileges
of the association and its stockholders, members, accountholders,
depositors, officers, and directors and has the authority to take
over the assets and operations of the association. 09 A conservator
is appointed to operate or dispose of the association as a going con-
cern and is specifically empowered to take any necessary steps to
put the association in a sound and solvent condition, to carry on
the business of the association, and to preserve and conserve the
assets and property of the association." 0 A receiver is appointed to
liquidate the assets and to resolve the affairs of a failed savings
association."'
included capital forbearances based on "regulatory goodwill;" Congress could not have in-
tended a result so inequitable as complete abrogation); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21
Cl. Ct. 112 (Ct. CI. 1990) (the government agreed to allow association to amortize regulatory
goodwill over a 35-year period, dismissing government's motion for summary judgment).
107. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1821, 1822, 1823 (West 1989).
108. Id. § 1441a(b)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). The regulations of the FHLBB and the
FSLIC in effect on the date of FIRREA's enactment are to continue in effect until such time
as they are modified, terminated, or superseded. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 401(h), (i); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988) (repealed 1989). The FHLBB regulations governing the ap-
pointment of conservators and receivers for savings associations were transferred to the
OTS, while those governing conservatorship and receivership powers were transferred to the
FDIC. 54 Fed. Reg. 41349 (1989); 54 Fed. Reg. 42799 (1989). Following the transfer of such
regulations, the OTS removed the regulations concerning the appointment of conservators
and receivers. 54 Fed. Reg. 49411 (1989). The FDIC has also removed many of the regula-
tions transferred to its authority governing the conduct of conservatorships and receiver-
ships. 55 Fed. Reg. 46495 (1990).
109. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2) (West 1989).
110. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(D); see HousE CONFERENCE REPORT No. 101-222, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 396 (1989), reprinted in, [1989] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 432, 435.
111. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(E).
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In addition to the foregoing general powers, the FDIA, as
amended by FIRREA, enumerates specific powers available to
both conservators and receivers.112 These powers include the abil-
ity to:
(1) merge the association with another federally-insured deposi-
tory institution;11
(2) transfer any asset or liability of the association with, in the
case of a transfer to another depository institution, the consent of
appropriate regulatory authorities;" 4
(3) pay all valid obligations of the association;"'
(4) obtain a stay of legal proceedings to which the association is
or becomes a party for a period not to exceed forty-five days in the
case of a conservator and ninety days in the case of a receiver; 16
(5) litigate any appealable judgment involving the association in
place of the association, with all rights available to the association
and the conservator or receiver in its corporate capacity, including
112. The statutory authority of conservators and receivers is set forth with greater speci-
ficity in FIRREA than under the federal banking laws in effect at the time of FIRREA's
enactment. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(1988) (amended 1989) (granting general author-
ity to conservators to operate failed savings associations with all of the power of the mem-
bers, direqtors and officers of those associations); 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1988) (repealed 1989)
(listing the powers of receivers of failed savings associations).
113. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(2)(G) (West 1989).
114. Id.
115. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(H).
116. Id. § 1821(d)(12). The legislative history indicates that the stay provision was in-
cluded to give the newly appointed conservator or receiver an opportunity to analyze pend-
ing litigation in order to determine how best to proceed. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at
331. In one case, a court denied the FDIC's request for a stay where the FDIC had been
appointed as a receiver and a party to the litigation approximately three months prior to the
enactment of FIRREA and six months prior to its request for a stay. FDIC v. Taylor, 727 F.
Supp. 326, 327-28 (S.D. Tex. 1989). In another case, the RTC was denied its request for a
stay where the case was commenced only eight days before the appointment of the receiver
because the court did not believe the receiver needed additional time to become familiar
with the case. Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 729 F. Supp. 1508, 1509-10
(D.N.J. 1990). But see Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 737 F. Supp. 18, 20
(D.N.J. 1990) (granting 180-day stay while plaintiff's claim was processed through receiver's
ordinary claims procedure); Circle Indus. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 447, 455
(E.D. N.Y. 1990) (dismissing plaintiff's claims because such claims had not been submitted
to the receiver under the 180-day claims procedure); see also Franklin Sav. Ass'n v. Victoria
Sav. Ass'n, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15904 (D.Kan. 1989) (upholding RTC's right to exercise
45-day stay following its appointment as conservator); Prince George Joint Venture v. Sun-
belt Savings F.S.B., 744 F. Supp 133, 135 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that the grant of the 90-
day stay is mandatory upon the receiver's request).
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the right to remove the litigation to federal court;117
(6) bring civil actions against the officers and directors of the
association for their gross negligence or intentional tortious mis-
conduct in the operation of the affairs of the association; l""
(7) disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease to which the as-
sociation is a party that the conservator or receiver determines to
be burdensome to the association, provided that the repudiation
will promote the orderly administration of the association's af-
fairs;11 and
(8) exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the spe-
cific powers granted to the conservator or receiver. 120
In addition to the foregoing powers, the receiver also is author-
ized to organize new federal savings associations to take over the
assets and liabilities of failed associations,' 2' liquidate failed as-
sociations and realize upon their assets,122 evaluate the claims of
creditors of failed associations,'23 pay off insured deposits' 24 and
distribute the amounts received upon liquidation of an association
to its depositors, other creditors, and stockholders. 125
In general, courts lack the authority to enjoin or otherwise re-
strict the conservator or receiver from exercising its powers or
functions once appointed. With respect to the conservatorship/re-
ceivership powers of the FDIC and the RTC over federal and state
savings associations, sections 212(j) and 301 of FIRREA provide
117. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(13) (West 1989); see also id. § 1819(b); In re Meyerland Co.,
910 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir. 1990) (upholding the right of receiver to remove to federal
district court a case on appeal in state court); Piekarski v. Home Owners Say. Bank, 743 F.
Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1990) (upholding right of removal); RTC v. Key, 733 F. Supp. 1086, 1090
(N.D. Tex. 1990) (upholding right of conservator and receiver to remove state court litiga-
tion to federal court following the entry of final judgment and holding that the general
removal provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) governing the timing of removal are not applicable
to litigation involving savings associations in conservatorship or receivership). But see,
MTech Corp. v. FDIC, 729 F. Supp. 1134, 1137 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that general re-
moval provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) are applicable to litigation involving banks in
receivership).
118. The FDIC or RTC may also in certain circumstances bring such actions in its corpo-
rate capacity. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k) (West 1989).
119. Id. § 1821(e).
120. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(I).
121. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(F).
122. Id. § 1821(d)(2)(E).
123. Id. § 1821(d)(3).
124. Id. § 1821(f).
125. Id. § 1821(d)(11).
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that no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise
of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver except at the
request of the Board of Directors of the FDIC or the Director of
the OTS.126
B. Repudiation of Contracts and Leases
Section 212(e) of FIRREA, which by its terms provides authority
to conservators and receivers to repudiate any contract or lease to
which a failed association is a party, is among the most controver-
sial provisions of the Act. The section provides:
(1) In addition to any other rights a conservator or receiver may
have, the conservator or receiver for any insured depository institu-
tion may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease -
(A) to which such institution is a party;
(B) the performance of which the conservator or receiver, in the
conservator's or receiver's discretion, determines to be burdensome;
and
(C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the conservator or
receiver determines, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion, will
promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs.12 7
The conservator or receiver is required to determine whether it
should exercise this power with respect to any contract or lease
within a "reasonable period" following its appointment, although
reasonable is not defined in the statute.2 S
The only damages to which a beneficiary of a repudiated con-
126. FIRREA, supra note 2, at §§ 212(j), 301, (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(j)) (West
1989); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1989)); see.Shemonsky v. OTS, 733 F.
Supp. 892, 895 (M.D. Pa. 1990); see also, Gibraltar Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, Inc. v. State Sav.
and Loan Ass'n, 607 F. Supp. 722, 723 (N.D. Ca. 1985); First Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 531 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Haw. 1981) (construing substantially similar
provision of pre-FIRREA law governing power of FSLIC as receiver).
127. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 212(e) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e) (West 1989)).
128. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(2) (West 1989). In a policy statement issued on April 10, 1990,
the RTC limited the time period for repudiation of collateralized borrowing agreements to
60 days following its appointment as conservator or receiver. 55 Fed. Reg. 14368 (1990)
[hereinafter Collateralized Borrowing Policy Statement]. A 180-day period for repudiation
of collateralized letters of credit issued by failed savings associations prior to the enactment
of FIRREA in connection with capital market financings was announced by the RTC in an
unpublished Policy Statement dated September 25, 1990 [hereinafter Collateralized Letter
of Credit Policy Statement].
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tract or lease are entitled are actual direct compensatory damages,
determined as of the date of the appointment of the conservator or
receiver (or the date of repudiation in the case of "qualified finan-
cial contracts" 129). 13 0 FIRREA precludes recovery for punitive or
exemplary damages, damages for lost profits or opportunity, or
damages for pain and suffering.1' 1 In the case of repudiated quali-
fied financial contracts, compensatory damages include normal and
reasonable costs of cover or any other reasonable measure of dam-
ages generally used with respect to such contracts. 3 2 Termination,
acceleration, or default provisions included in contracts with sav-
ings associations that are triggered by the insolvency of the associ-
ation or the appointment of a conservator or receiver are generally
not enforceable, except in the case of qualified financial contracts.
Therefore, they are ineffective methods for escaping the uncer-
tainty of a conservatorship/receivership, or for accelerating
damages. 3 1
Specific provisions in the Act concern the repudiation of leases,
contracts for the sale of real property, service contracts, and quali-
fied financial contracts. 3 4 With respect to any repudiated lease
under which the association is the lessee, the lessor is entitled to
receive the contractual rent accruing prior to the later of (1) the
date on which the repudiation notice is mailed, or (2) the date on
which the repudiation becomes effective, provided the lessor is not
in default under the lease. The lessor is not, however, entitled to
unpaid rent or damages due under any acceleration clause or pen-
alty provision of the lease.3 5
With respect to leases under which the association is the lessor,
the lessee may elect to retain its leasehold interest for the term of
the lease, notwithstanding repudiation of the lease by the conser-
vator or receiver, as long as the lessee is not itself in default under
the lease. If the lessee continues its possession of the property, it is
required to make rental payments to the association, but is permit-
129. "Qualified financial contracts" include securities contracts, commodity contracts, for-
ward contracts, repurchase agreements, and swap agreements. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821 (e)(8)(D)
(West 1989). Commercial loan participation agreements are expressly excluded from the
statutory definition but may be incorporated by regulation. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(D)(ii).
130. Id. § 1821(e)(3).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1821(e)(12).
134. Id. § 1821(e)(4)-(8).
135. Id. § 1821(e)(4).
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ted to offset any damages that it suffers as a result of the associa-
tion's non-performance under the lease against the amounts that it
owes to the association.
136
Similar rights are provided to purchasers under repudiated con-
tracts for the sale of real property who are in possession of the
property at the time of repudiation and are not in default under
the contract. Such purchasers may either treat the contract as ter-
minated or remain in possession of the property.137 If a purchaser
elects to remain in possession of the property, the association is
required to deliver title to the property to the purchaser in accor-
dance with the terms of the sales contract but is not required to
perform any other obligations of the contract.138 The purchaser is
required to continue to make scheduled payments of the purchase
price due after the date of repudiation. 39 The purchaser may,
however, offset against such payments any damages that it suffers
due to the association's failure to fully perform its obligations
under the contract.1
40
With respect to service contracts, claims for services rendered
prior to the appointment of a conservator are to be paid by the
conservator or receiver in accordance with the claims procedures
applicable to creditors generally.' 4' If the conservator or receiver
accepts performance under a service contract after its appoint-
ment, it is required to pay for such services as an administrative
expense of the conservatorship or receivership. 14 2 The acceptance
of such services does not, however, preclude the conservator or re-
ceiver from subsequently disaffirming the contract so as to prevent
the performance of future services.'43
Special protections are also provided to the beneficiaries of qual-
ified financial contracts to which a failed association is a party. For
example, FIRREA preserves the contractual rights of the benefi-
ciary of any qualified financial contract to terminate or liquidate
the contract following the appointment of a conservator or re-
ceiver.14 FIRREA also ensures the beneficiary's ability to enforce
136. Id. § 1821(e)(5).
137. Id. § 1821(e)(6).
138. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(ii).
139. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(i)(I).
140. Id. § 1821(e)(6)(B)(i)(II).
141. Id. § 1821(e)(7)(A)(i).
142. Id. § 1821(e)(7)(B)(i)-(i).
143. Id. § 1821(e)(7)(C).
144. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(i).
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its rights under security arrangements with respect to the qualified
financial contract,145 and to offset against amounts due the associa-
tion any "termination value," "payment amount," or "other trans-
fer obligation" arising under the contract.146 In addition, a conser-
vator or receiver may not attempt to avoid any transfer of money
or property to another depository institution that has been made
in connection with a qualified financial contract, 47 provided such
transfer was not made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud the association, its creditors, or the conservator or receiver
for the association. 4 In addition, if the conservator or receiver
transfers a qualified financial contract to another depository insti-
tution, it is required to transfer to the same depository institution
all of the qualified financial contracts made with a single entity, 49
all the claims related to such contracts, 50 and all the collateral se-
curing such contracts.'51 The conservator or receiver is required to
use its best efforts to notify all parties to any transferred qualified
financial contract of the transfer on the following business day.15 2
An additional limitation on the broad repudiation power granted
in FIRREA appears in subparagraph 212(e)(11), which prohibits
the avoidance of any legally enforceable or perfected security inter-
est in the assets of any depository institution, except where such
interest has been taken in contemplation of the institution's insol-
vency or with an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institution
or its creditors. 53 The provision does not prevent the conservator
or receiver from repudiating the obligations of a failed savings as-
sociation secured by a perfected security interest in collateral. It
does, however, ensure that the collateral is available to compensate
the beneficiary of the security interest for any damages permitted
in connection with such repudiation.'54
The repudiation power has received significant attention in the
context of collateralized securities issued by savings associations
145. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(ii).
146. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(A)(iii).
147. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(C)(i).
148. Id. § 1821(e)(8)(C)(ii).
149. Id. § 1821(e)(9)(A)(i).
150. Id. § 1821(e)(9)(A)(ii)-(iii).
151. Id. § 1821(e)(9)(A)(iv).
152. Id. § 1821(e)(10)(A).
153. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 212(e)(11) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(11) (West
1989)).
154. See Collateralized Borrowing Policy Statement, supra note 128.
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and collateralized letters of credit used to provide credit support
for securities issued by third parties because of the potential ad-
verse effect of the repudiation power on the markets for such se-
curities. The RTC has issued two policy statements concerning
these obligations. 155 While reiterating the RTC's broad repudiation
powers, the RTC indicated in its policy statement concerning col-
lateralized securities that, rather than simply repudiating all future
payment obligations, the repudiation power may be used to call,
redeem, or prepay such securities. In, such event, the collateral se-
curing the obligations could be liquidated and the proceeds paid to
or retained by the holders of the securities to the extent of the
damages allowed by FIRREA. In the second policy statement, the
RTC explained that in the case of collateralized letters of credit
issued prior to the enactment of FIRREA in connection with capi-
tal market financing transactions the repudiation power could be
used to accelerate the association's payment obligation, even if the
beneficiary's right to draw on the letter had not accrued at the
commencement of the receivership, with the collateral being used
to satisfy the payment obligation. In both cases, the holders of the
securities or the beneficiaries of the letter of credit would be un-
secured creditors of the association if the proceeds of the collateral
were insufficient to pay their claims in full. To the extent such pro-
ceeds exceed the secured obligations, excess proceeds would be in-
cluded in the assets of the failed association and would be availa-
ble to satisfy the claims of other creditors.
FIRREA's contract repudiation provision is controversial be-
cause of its apparent application to non-executory contracts. While
the RTC has conceded that it is not empowered to repudiate con-
tracts that have been fully performed by all parties, it maintains
that it may repudiate contracts under which a savings association
has outstanding obligations, notwithstanding completed perform-
ance by other parties to the contract.1 56 It is undoubtedly to the
government's advantage to be able to repudiate burdensome or
costly obligations of a failed savings association. If, however, a con-
servator or receiver is allowed to repudiate contracts under which
the other party has substantially performed its obligations, con-
155. Collateralized Borrowing Policy Statement, supra note 128; Collateralized Letter of
Credit Policy Statement, supra note 128.
156. Gibson v. RTC, 750 F. Supp. 1565, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Corrected Memorandum of
Law in Support of RTC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Gibson v. RTC No. 90-0498-CIV-
MARCUS at 26 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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cerns will naturally arise over the wisdom of doing business With
savings associations perceived to be financially vulnerable.
The traditional repudiation authority of common law receivers
extends only to executory contracts.'5 Similarly, under the federal
Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy trustee may only reject "executory
contracts and unexpired leases."' 58 Prior to FIRREA, federal bank-
ing laws did not specifically provide for the repudiation of con-
tracts, although both the FDIC and the FSLIC exercised this
power from time to time in connection with their general conserva-
torship/receivership powers. 59
The legislative history of FIRREA seems to indicate that in
adopting section 212(e), Congress merely intended to codify the
existing repudiation authority. 60 Unfortunately, the limits of the
FDIC's and the FSLIC's historic repudiation powers are unclear.' 6 '
The FHLBB regulations governing the conduct of FSLIC con-
servatorships and receiverships for federal savings associations
have, since 1958, authorized the conservator or receiver to "repudi-
ate any contract or lease he considers burdensome."' 62 In 1985, the
157. 66 Am. Jur. 2d, Receivers § 229 (1973).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
159. See, e.g., FSLIC v. Angell, Holmes & Lea, 838 F.2d 395 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 848 (1988); FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 806 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1986);
North Mississippi Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1984),
rev'd, 476 U.S. 426 (1986); Argonaut Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. FDIC, 392 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 839 (1968); UNISYS Corp. v. FDIC, 724 F. Supp. 454 (W.D.
Tex. 1988); Savings Bank of Rockland County v. FDIC, 668 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
vacated, 703 F. Supp. 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 80 Pine Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 424 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
160. In the section-by-section analysis of Senate Bill 774, the Senate precursor to FIR-
REA which included a repudiation provision similar to that included in the Act, the legisla-
tion's sponsors explained that the repudiation provision was intended to codify "the FDIC's
common-law right as a liquidating receiver to repudiate or disaffirm a contract or lease
which the FDIC considers to be burdensome." 135 CONG. REc. S. 6907, 6911 (daily ed. July
19, 1989). The House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs similarly explained
that the receivership powers included in H.R. 1278 "essentially parallel those heretofore
exercised by the FSLIC and the FDIC," and that the legislation "confirms the historic right
of a conservator or receiver to disaffirm or repudiate contracts." See Hous. REPORT, supra
note 7, at 330.
161. The cases decided to date simply refer to the right of a conservator or receiver to
repudiate or reject any contract. They do not address the question of whether the authority
extends to non-executory contracts. FSLIC v. Angell, Holmes & Lea, 838 F.2d at 396 (con-
cerning the FSLIC's repudiation power); Gibson v. RTC, 750 F. Supp. 1565 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
Union Bank v. FSLIC, 724 F. Supp. 468, 471 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
162. 12 C.F.R. § 548.2(l), 23 Fed. Reg. 9878, 9908 (1958) (authorizing the FSLIC as con-
servator for federally chartered savings associations to "repudiate any lease or contract
which it considers burdensome"), amended and redesignated as 12 C.F.R. § 548.2(k) at 44
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FHLBB proposed significant revisions to its conservatorship/re-
ceivership regulations which would have expressly limited the re-
pudiation power to "executory contracts and unexpired leases. "163
The proposed regulation limiting the repudiation power was never
adopted. However, in 1988, one of the 1985 proposed amendments
was adopted as a final regulation. 6 4 That regulation, which was
repealed in 1990, provided a payment priority for repudiated exec-
utory contracts and unexpired leases. 6 5 The regulation was silent
as to the priority of repudiated non-executory contracts. In addi-
tion, the introductory statement to the proposed 1985 amendments
provided that "[t]he power to reject leases and executory contracts
is an important traditional power of the receiver" and that in ap-
plying the repudiation provisions, the receiver would seek guidance
from the court decisions rendered under the Bankruptcy Code,
particularly in applying the term "executory" which was not de-
fined in the proposed amendments. 6 6 In 1985, the FHLBB appar-
ently viewed its repudiation power as limited to executory
contracts.
Notwithstanding the arguments that can be based upon legisla-
tive history and historical interpretations of the receivership pow-
ers, the fact remains, however, that the plain language of 12
U.S.C.A. § 1821(e), as amended by FIRREA, provides that any
contract may be repudiated. Moreover, the presence of the word
"executory" in the repudiation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
demonstrates that Congress could have used the term had it in-
tended to so limit the repudiation power under the federal banking
Fed. Reg. 39108, 39141 (1979), redesignated as 12 C.F.R. § 382.2(k) at 54 Fed. Reg. 42800-
01, (1989); 12 C.F.R. § 549.3(1), 23 Fed. Reg. 9878, 9909 (1958) (authorizing the FSLIC as
receiver for federally-chartered savings associations to "repudiate any lease or contract
which it considers burdensome"), amended and redesignated as 12 C.F.R. § 549.3(a) at 44
Fed. Reg. 39108, 39142 (1979), redesignated as 12 C.F.R. § 383.3(a) at 54 Fed. Reg. 42800-01
(1989); see also 12 C.F.R. § 569a.6(c)(3) 33 Fed. Reg. 14366-67 (1968) (authorizing the
FSLIC as receiver for state-chartered saving associations to "repudiate any lease or contract
which it considers burdensome"), redesignated as 12 C.F.R. § 388.3(c)(3) at 54 Fed. Reg.
42800-01 (1989).
163. Proposed Reg. 12 C.F.R. § 569c.6(f)(3), 50 Fed. Reg. 48970, 48991 (1985).
164. 53 Fed. Reg. 25129, 25131 (1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 389.11(c) (1990) formerly,
12 C.F.R. § 569c.11).
165. 12 C.F.R. § 389.11(c) (1990), removed, 55 Fed. Reg. 46495, 46496 (1990).
166. 50 Fed. Reg. 48976 (1985). In directing the receiver to look for guidance as to the
meaning of "executory" to court decisions rendered under 11 U.S.C. § 365, the FHLLB
acknowledged that such decisions had generally applied the "Countryman" definition, which
the FHLBB explained to be "[a] contract under which the obligations of both the bankrupt
and other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other." Id.
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laws. Critics of the power have raised questions as to whether re-
pudiation of a non-executory contract is constitutional under the
due process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment.16 7 It is
uncertain whether those espousing the constitutional arguments
will prevail in federal court.
C. Claims Procedures: Coit Independence Joint Venture v.
FSLIC
After a savings association is placed into receivership, the re-
ceiver is required to pay off the association's insured deposits as
quickly as possible with cash or by making available to each depos-
itor a transferred deposit account at another depository institution
in an amount equal to the depositor's insured deposit. 6 8 One way
in which this is accomplished is the organization by the OTS of a
new federal association pursuant to section 11(d)(2)(F) of the
FDIA following the establishment of a receivership and the subse-
quent transfer by contract of substantially all of the assets and cer-
tain of the liabilities, including deposit accounts, of the association
in receivership to the new association. The RTC is then appointed
as conservator for the new association and operates the new associ-
ation until a purchaser can be found for substantially all of its as-
sets and liabilities or for its deposit accounts. At the time of the
sale of the assets or deposits of the new association, the new associ-
ation is itself placed into receivership. Following the sale, the new
association is liquidated or its affairs otherwise resolved.6
As part of the liquidation or resolution process, the receiver is
required to request,170 by publication and direct correspondence, 17 1
that the creditors of the failed association present their claims, to-
gether with evidence supporting the existence of such claims, to
the receiver by a specific date not less than ninety days after the
167. See, e.g., Gibson v. RTC, 750 F. Supp. at 1568 n.2.
168. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(f) (West 1989).
169. The funding for an insured deposit payoff, in the case of a failed savings association,
is supplied from the Savings Association Insurance Fund. Id. § 1821(f)(1)(B). The receiver is
then subrogated to the rights of each depositor as against the failed association up to the
amount paid to such depositor. Id. § 1821(g)(1). The receiver may require the depositors to
prove their claims. Id. § 1821(f)(2). The FDIC and RTC are each authorized to develop
administrative procedures for determination of disputed claims. Id. § 1821(f)(3)(A). Claims
determined administratively are subject to judicial review. Id. 1821(f)(4).
170. Id. § 1821(d)(3)(B)(i).
171. Id. § 1821(d)(3)(C).
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publication date of the request. 172 The receiver must determine
whether to allow or disallow claims presented within 180 days after
the date on which each claim is filed or by a later date that is
acceptable to the claimant.17 3 Claims submitted after the cut-off
date specified in the receiver's notification to creditors are to be
disallowed 17 4 unless the claimant can demonstrate that it did not
receive notification in time to file its claim before the cut-off
date 75 and the claim is filed in time to permit payment of the
claim, notwithstanding the late filing. 76 If a claim is disallowed,
the claimant has the option of either (1) seeking administrative re-
view of the receiver's decision, or (2) bringing suit on such claim in
the United States District Court for the district in which the asso-
ciation's principal office is located or the District of Columbia. 177
The claimant must request administrative review or file suit on his
claim within sixty days of the earlier of (1) the end of the 180-day
period available to the receiver for determining the claim, or (2)
the date of the notice of disallowance. 178 If the claimant fails to do
so, the claim is disallowed and the claimant's rights with respect to
the claim are terminated.179 Administrative review of the receiver's
decision will be provided by either the FDIC or the RTC. An on-
the-record hearing may be provided at the claimant's request with
the consent of the reviewing entity.8 0 The decision of the review-
ing entity is subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act.
A claimant who elects to file a suit on its claim following disal-
lowance by the receiver is entitled to a de novo review of the mer-
its of the claim. The proceeding does not constitute a review of the
receiver's decision.' This is advantageous to the claimant because
the court is not required to give weight or deference to the re-
172. Id. § 1821(d)(3)(B)(i). The notice must be republished one and two months following
the initial publication. Id. § 1821(d)(3)(B)(ii).
173. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i). An expedited, 90-day claims procedure is available to claim-
ants who allege that they (i) have a valid and enforceable security interest, and (ii) will
suffer irreparable harm under the 180-day procedure. Id. § 1821(d)(8)(i)-(ii).
174. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(i).
175. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii)(I).
176. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(C))(ii)(II).
177. Id. § 1821(d)(6)(A).
178. Id.
179. Id. § 1821(d)(6)(B).
180. Id. § 1821(d)(7)(A).
181. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(E).
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ceiver's decision, as would be required if the claim were considered
under the Administrative Procedures Act.
182
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Coit Indepen-
dence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, s3 the FSLIC had successfully ar-
gued before many courts in which suits were pending against failed
savings associations that, upon the appointment of the receiver,
the court lost subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims
and that the FSLIC, as receiver, had exclusive jurisdiction over
such claims. 8 The Supreme Court, after reviewing the statutory
authority, found in Coit that Congress had not granted the FSLIC
adjudicatory power over claims but rather that the FSLIC's power,
"much like an ordinary insurance company, [is] to pay those
claims proved to its satisfaction."'18 5 Because Congress had not
granted adjudicatory authority to the FSLIC, a court's de novo
consideration of the claims of creditors could not be viewed as a
restraint on the exercise of the receiver's powers.8 " The Court's
finding that Congress had not granted the FSLIC adjudicatory au-
thority over creditors' claims allowed the Court to avoid considera-
tion of the constitutional question raised by the plaintiff as to
whether such a grant would violate Article III of the Constitution
under the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.' 87
The FSLIC also argued in Coit that it was necessary for a claim-
182. See, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 576 (1989) (stating
that "a receiver's distribution of assets need not be postponed pending the resolution of
disputed claims in other courts: 'The power to fix the time for distribution may include the
power ... to decline to postpone distribution awaiting disposition of litigation in another
court over a contested claim'." (quoting from Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 224 (1929))).
183. 489 U.S. 561 (1989).
184. See e.g., Red Fox Indus., Inc. v. FSLIC, 832 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1987); North Miss.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054
(1986); Resna Assoc., Ltd. v. Financial Equity Mortgage Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1371, 1372
(D.N.J. 1987); Baer v. Abel, 637 F. Supp. 343, 347 (W.D. Wash. 1986). In these cases the
FSLIC had successfully relied on the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b)(1), which provided
the FSLIC, as receiver, with authority to liquidate the assets of failed thrifts in an orderly
manner; 12 U.S.C. § 1729(d), which provided the FSLIC with the authority to settle, com-
promise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured institutions; and 12 U.S.C. §
1464(d)(6)(C) which provided that, subject to certain exceptions, no court take any action to
restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the conservator or receiver. But see
Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. CHG Int'l Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1215-22 (9th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that the FSLIC did not have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over disputed claims
following the appointment of a receiver), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 935 (1988).
185. Coit, 484 U.S. at 574-75.
186. Id. at 574-77.
187. Id. at 578-79 (citing Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
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ant to exhaust the administrative procedures for determination of
claims prior to commencement of judicial proceedings. 188 With re-
spect to the FSLIC's exhaustion of administrative remedies argu-
ment, the Court found that the administrative procedures in effect
at the time were problematic. First, they clearly contemplated that
the FSLIC would have adjudicatory power over the claims of credi-
tors.189 Second, they allowed the FSLIC to hold the claims indefi-
nitely "for further review."' 90 This effectively gave the FSLIC the
ability to bury claims in the administrative process with no ade-
quate remedy available to the claimant.' The problem was exac-
erbated by the fact that while the FSLIC claim was pending, the
statute of limitations with respect to the state law issues was run-
ning, thereby further depriving the claimant of recourse to the
courts in cases in which the FSLIC's decision was delayed.' 92
Congress was clearly mindful of Coit when it enacted FIRREA.
Although the Act contemplates that state court proceedings will be
delayed while the receiver considers the claims presented, 9 ' Con-
gress did not elect to grant the receiver adjudicatory authority. In
fact, the Act expressly denies courts the power to review the re-
ceiver's denial of a claim in cases brought pursuant to. section
212(d)(5)(D), thus ensuring that courts will consider de novo the
claims of plaintiffs. As a result, Congress avoided the Article III
questions alluded to in Coit.
The claims procedure adopted in FIRREA is similar to the regu-
latory procedures that were in place at the time of the Coit deci-
sion with three important exceptions.' First, the statute does not
require a claimant to exhaust the administrative remedies prior to
litigating its claim in court.9 5 Second, the Act provides that the
receiver may not extend the 180-day period for determining claims
188. Id. at 585.
189. Id. at 586.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 586-87..
193. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(6)(A), (B) (West 1989); id. § 1821(d)(8)(E).
194. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(3) (West 1989) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 575.3, 575.4 (1988);
compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(5) (West 1989) with 12 C.F.R. § 575.11 (1989); compare 12
U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(6) (West 1989) with 12 C.F.R. § 576.3 (1989); compare 12 U.S.C.A. §
1821(d)(8) (West 1989) with 12 C.F.R. § 577 (1989).
195. See 12 CFR § 575.1(a)(1989). But see Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Sav.
Bank, 737 F. Supp. 18 (D.N.J. 1990); Circle Indus. v. City Fed. Sav. Bank, 749 F. Supp. 447
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). These cases hold that claimants must exhaust the initial 180-day claims
procedure prior to judicial consideration of claims against an institution in receivership.
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without the express written consent of the claimant. 196 Finally, the
Act provides that statutes of limitation are tolled by the filing of
claims with the receiver. 19 7 As a consequence of FIRREA, the fed-
eral banking laws now provide for an orderly administrative proce-
dure for determining claims which also preserves the rights of
claimants to obtain a judicial determination of the merits of their
claims.
IV. How A THRIFT GETS RESOLVED
The remainder of this article will focus on how the RTC disposes
of or "resolves" failed savings associations for which it acts as con-
servator or receiver.' 98 The fundamental mission of the RTC is to
carry out a program, under the general guidance of the RTC Over-
sight Board, 99 to manage and resolve institutions that come under
its jurisdiction and to dispose of any residual assets in a manner
that "(i) maximizes returns and minimizes losses; (ii) minimizes
the impact on local real estate and financial markets; and (iii)
maximizes the preservation of the availability and affordability of
residential property for low and moderate income individuals. '200
Once an association is placed in receivership, the RTC must, in
accordance with its mission, determine the most cost effective way
to resolve the association. In the case of failed associations with
little going concern value, the RTC is likely simply to pay off the
association's insured deposits and subsequently liquidate the asso-
ciation. If, however, an association is deemed to have a meaningful
196. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(5)(ii) (West 1989) with 12 CFR § 575.11 (1989).
197. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d)(8)(D) (West 1989).
198. See id. § 1441a(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); see also supra notes 17, 44, 45 and
accompanying text.
199. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(4) (West Cure. Supp. 1990).
200. Strategic Plan for Resolution Trust Corporation, 54 Fed. Reg. 46574, 46578 (1989)
[hereinafter Proposed Strategic Plan]; RTC, Strategic Plan for Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion at 2 (1989) (RTC Seminar Materials, Session A) [hereinafter Final Stragetic Plan]. As
of September 30, 1990, 287 institutions with approximately $92 billion in assets were re-
solved by the RTC. Conservatorship Caseload; Asset Inventory, RTC Review, Sept. 1990, at
1; Resolutions, RTC Review, Sept. 1990, at 3. Another 493 associations with assets valued at
$142 billion remained in the RTC's inventory. Who Will Prosper From the Savings and
Loan Bailout?, 7 Real Est. Fin. Update, Jan. 1991, at 3. By the end of 1990, the RTC had
accumulated $16.6 billion in property from 548 failed thrifts and sold less than a third of it.
It is estimated that more than $60 billion in real estate may come into the RTC's hands
before the deadline established by FIRREA on August 9, 1992. The RTC's National Monu-
ments, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
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going concern value, the RTC most likely will attempt to sell the
association as a going concern.210
If a failed savings association is to be marketed, the OTS will
organize a new federal savings association immediately following
the commencement of the receivership and will transfer by con-
tract substantially all of the assets and deposit liabilities of the old
failed association to the new association.2 0 2 Most of the non-de-
posit liabilities of the failed association will be retained by the old
association. 3 .The RTC will then be appointed as conservator for
the new association. The business of the old association will con-
tinue through the new association until a purchaser can be found.
In marketing the new association, the RTC will seek a purchaser
who is willing to acquire a significant portion of the assets and lia-
bilities of the new association through a purchase and assumption
transaction or, if such a purchaser cannot be found, a depository
institution that will purchase the insured deposits of the new asso-
ciation in an "insured deposit transfer. ' 20 4 The RTC also may at-
tempt to dispose of the branches of an association separately, 20 5
although a single purchaser for the entire association appears pref-
erable because of the expense and difficulty of allocating the assets
and liabilities of an association among its branches. If the RTC
attempts to dispose of branches separately, it will determine how
the branches should be packaged.
A bidders conference will be held shortly after the organization
of the new association at which potential acquirers, which include
federally-insured depository institutions and depository institution
holding companies, are provided with detailed financial informa-
tion regarding the association being sold, as well as copies of the
201. A Buyer's Guide: How to Purchase a Savings Association from the RTC, [Current]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 70,503, at 46,519 (Mar. 2, 1990) [hereinafter Buyer's Guide].
202. Miller, The Effect of Thrift Receiverships, Conservatorships and FIRREA on Title
to Real Property at 2, in Negotiating and Litigating with the Resolution Trust Corporation
(Aug. 1990) (ABA Seminar Materials). See supra notes 168, 169 and accompanying text.
203. Wilk, Transactions By and With the Resolution Trust Corporation Under the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, at 5, in Negotiating
and Litigating With the Resolution Trust Corporation (Aug. 1990) (ABA Seminar Materi-
als). In some cases, however, leases and loan commitments are transferred to the new
association.
204. Buyer's Guide, supra note 201, at 46,519.
205. Id.; see Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46576 discussing the factors to
be evaluated by the RTC in determining whether to sell branches separately. The Final
Strategic Plan eliminated the detailed discussion of branch sales found in the Proposed
Strategic Plan, and merely mentions branch sales as one of a variety of resolution struc-
tures. Final Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 37.
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RTC's standard transaction documents.2 0 6 To expedite the process,
relatively little time is provided for potential acquirers to conduct
a physical inspection of the association being sold.207 Therefore,
potential acquirers must be prepared to base their bids primarily
on the financial information provided by the RTC. In addition, po-
tential bidders must obtain all regulatory approvals necessary for
the acquisition before submitting their bids.20 8 The RTC requires
that all conditions to a bidder's proposal be included in its bid.
Once a bid has been selected, the RTC will not engage in substan-
tive negotiations over the terms of the transaction.
A. The Preferred Resolution: The Purchase and Assumption
Transaction
In a typical purchase and assumption transaction, the acquiring
depository institution or holding company purchases the cash, in-
vestment grade securities, consumer loans and the performing first
mortgages on one-to-four family residential properties of the new
association and assumes its deposit liabilities °.20  The purchaser
usually has the opportunity to assume the employee pension plans
and existing leases of the new association as well.2 10 The RTC pro-
vides sufficient cash to ensure that the liabilities assumed are not
greater than the book value of the assets acquired. 11 It will not,
however, provide enough funds to fully capitalize the acquiring in-
stitution for regulatory purposes. 212
When an acquirer buys substantially all of the assets of the new
association, the transaction is known as a "whole thrift"
purchase.213 If, however, the acquirer is only willing to purchase
206. Buyer's Guide, supra note 201, at 46,419.
207. See Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200; at 46576; Final Strategic Plan, supra
note 200 at 12, 37; Goodman, RTC Real Estate Sales, Just Do It, REAL EST. REv. 26, 29
(Winter 1991).
208. Buyer's Guide, supra note 201, at 46,519.
209. See, e.g., Buyer's Guide, supra note 201 at 46,519.
210. RTC, How to Work with the RTC (June 21, 1990) (RTC Seminar Materials, Session
A: Purchase and Assumption Agreement).
211. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46576; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 35-36.
212. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46576; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 35-36.
213. The RTC defines a whole thrift purchase as follows:
Whole Institution-An Acquirer purchases all or substantially all of the savings asso-
ciation's assets, including troubled or high risk assets, and assumes all or substan-
tially all of the institution's deposits and certain other liabilities. In such cases, pur-
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the good assets (i.e., the cash, securities and performing loans), the
transaction is known as a "clean thrift" purchase.214 In either case,
the assets that are not acquired will be retained by the new associ-
ation and will eventually be disposed of when that association is
liquidated or transferred to the RTC in its corporate capacity for
subsequent disposition.21
In the standard purchase and assumption transaction the ac-
quirer may contract to acquire the assets of a failed association
with a limited right to return or "put" the non-performing assets
to the RTC a short time following the closing.21 Other problem
assets, such as those with a cloud on title or litigation liability, may
also be returned.217 Asset puts serve as an incentive to potential
acquirers since the RTC does not generally provide those inter-
ested in acquiring a failed association sufficient time to inspect
thoroughly the association's records. 1
The acquirer may also negotiate a "call" option which will per-
mit it to acquire additional assets of the association within a pe-
riod of time, usually 120 days, following the closing. 219 In addition,
the RTC, in its corporate capacity, will provide a limited indemni-
fication to the acquirer which will protect it against losses related
to liabilities of the association that the acquirer has not assumed
and from losses resulting from claims arising in connection with
chasers bid based on their estimate of the franchise value of the institution and the
amount of cash they want from the RTC to offset the shortfall between the bidders'
estimates of the value of the assets to be acquired and the liabilities to be assumed.
The transaction is awarded to the qualified bidder requiring the least amount of cash
from the RTC.
Buyer's Guide, supra note 201, at 46,519.
214. The RTC defines a clean thrift purchase as follows: "Clean Institution-An acquirer
purchases only the good or low risk assets as well as cash from the RTC and assumes all or
substantially all of the savings association's deposits and certain other liabilities. The trans-
action is awarded to the qualified bidder offering the highest premium." Id.
215. See Wilk, supra note 203, at 5.
216. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46576; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 37. At the end of September, 1990, assets subject to "puts" totalled $13 billion. This
figure is net of puts previously exercised or expired. Resolutions, RTC Review, Sept. 1990,
at 3.
217. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46576. While the Proposed Strategic
Plan specifically notes the type of assets that can be returned to the RTC, the Final Strate-
gic Plan is silent with respect to the specific assets that are returnable to the RTC.
218. See Final Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 12, 37; Goodman, supra note 207, at 29.
219. RTC, How to Work with the RTC (June 21, 1990) (RTC Seminar Materials, Session
A: Purchase and Assumption Agreement). But see Citing Weak Response RTC Ends Call
Option, Am. Banker, Sept. 14, 1990, at 12, col. 4.
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purchased assets, provided such losses result solely from the action
or inaction of the failed association.2 °
B. The Override Rule
An issue that has received much attention in connection with
purchase and assumption transactions is the extent to which banks
may operate the acquired branches of failed savings associations as
bank branches. FIRREA authorizes the RTC to approve emer-
gency acquisitions of failed savings associations or their assets by
banks and bank holding companies, notwithstanding state law to
the contrary. Before approving such an acquisition, however, the
RTC must first determine that (1) severe financial conditions
threaten the stability of a significant number of savings associa-
tions or savings associations with significant financial resources, (2)
such acquisition would lessen the risks to the RTC, and (3) the
acquisition will not present a substantial risk to the safety or
soundness of the savings association to be acquired or the acquir-
ing entity.22' FIRREA also provides that, in connection with such
acquisition, "a savings association may retain and operate any ex-
isting branch or branches or any other existing facilities. ' 222
The RTC has adopted a regulation interpreting the preceding
section of FIRREA to permit acquiring banks to operate as bank
branches any savings association branches acquired pursuant to
the emergency acquisition statute.2 The RTC rule is referred to
220. RTC, How to Work with the RTC (June 21, 1990) (RTC. Seminar Materials, Session
A: Indemnity Agreement).
221. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(West 1989). Section 601 of FIRREA also amended the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 to give the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem the authority to approve an application by a bank holding company to acquire a
healthy savings association. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 601 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §
18430) (West 1989).
222. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(k)(3).
223. Retention of Thrift Branches Acquired by Banks in Emergency Acquisitions, 55 Fed.
Reg. 22323 (1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 1611.1) [hereinafter Branch Retention]. The
rule became effective June 1, 1990. The RTC derives its authority to authorize such acquisi-
tions and to promulgate regulations from 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1990)
(which gives the RTC the powers of the FDIC set forth in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k) (West
1989)). Section 1823(k), as amended by the Act, authorizes emergency acquisitions to keep
the industry stable and the cost of resolution down. Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) (West
1989) provides that:
If a merger, consolidation, transfer, or acquisition under this subsection involves a
savings association ... and a bank or bank holding company, a savings association
may retain and operate any existing branch or branches or any other existing facili-
ties. If the savings association continues to exist as a separate entity, it may establish
and operate new branches to the same extent as any savings association that is not
affiliated with a bank holding company and the home office of which is located in the
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as the "Override Rule" because it effectively overrides the laws of
many states that restrict the establishment and operation of bank
branches. The Override Rule is based on the RTC's belief that the
provisions of 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k)(4)(A) must be read so as to
allow banks to retain and operate as bank branches any thrift
branches acquired pursuant to that section.224
Since the enactment of FIRREA, there have been at least two
challenges to the RTC's Override Rule. In Independent Commu-
nity Bankers of New Mexico v. Resolution Trust Corp.,225 the New
Mexico federal court expressly upheld the validity of the Override
Rule. The case involved the acquisition by a national bank located
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, of a failed savings association with
branches located throughout the state. The bank's bid was ex-
pressly conditioned on the override of a New Mexico statute limit-
ing branch banking to a county-wide basis.226 The court concluded
that the statutory provisions with respect to branching were am-
biguous and that the RTC's interpretation of the statute should,
therefore, be given deference. Because the court found the RTC's
interpretation of the statute as set forth in the Override Rule to be
neither arbitrary nor capricious, it upheld the regulation.2 27
In Arkansas State Bank Commissioner v. Resolution Trust
same State.
The RTC Override Rule provides as follows:
(a) Purpose. (1) Section 13(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C.
1823(k)), made applicable to the RTC by section 21A(b)(4) of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 1441a(b)(4)), grants to the RTC the power to authorize
emergency acquisitions of failed or failing savings associations. Under section 13(k),
the RTC may authorize such acquisitions notwithstanding any provision of State law,
upon making a determination that severe financial conditions threaten the stability of
a significant number of savings associations, or savings associations possessing signifi-
cant financial resources, and a determination that such authorization would lessen
the risk to the RTC. Authorizations of acquisitions of State-chartered savings associa-
tions are subject to prior RTC consultation with State officials and a vote of 75 per-
cent of the voting members of the RTC Board of Directors to authorize such acquisi-
tions over the objection of State officials.
(2) The regulations of this section provide for the retention and operation by ac-,
quiring banks of the offices of savings associations acquired pursuant to section 13(k).
(b) Each existing office or other existing facility of each savings association that is
merged or consolidated with, or the assets and liabilities of which are transferred to,
an insured bank pursuant to section 13(k) may be retained by the insured bank and
operated by the bank as a branch or other facility.
Branch Retention, supra, at 22328.
224. Branch Retention, supra note 223, at 22324.
225. [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 88,220, at 96,730 (D.N.M. June 15, 1990).
226. Id. at 96,731; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-5-3 (1978).
227. [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 88,220 at 96,732-34.
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Corp., the Eighth Circuit also upheld the validity of the Override
Rule. 22s Arkansas State Bank Commissioner involved a national
bank's bid to acquire twenty branch offices of a savings association
located in fifteen Arkansas counties. The Arkansas Bank Commis-
sioner sought to prevent the acquisition on the basis of state law
provisions restricting branching by banks.2 In a decision that
closely mirrored Independent Community Bankers of New Mex-
ico, the Eighth Circuit upheld the RTC's Override Rule based on
the court's conclusion that the provision of FIRREA was ambigu-
ous and that the Override Rule was a permissible construction of
the statute.3 °
Also at issue in the case was the question of whether the Over-
ride Rule and 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(k) violated the McFadden Act,2 1
which permits national banks to establish branches within their
home states only to the extent that state banks in such states are
allowed to branch. 3 2 The Eighth Circuit held that the McFadden
Act is not the exclusive source of branching authority and that sec-
tion 1823(k), as amended by FIRREA, also grants national banks
branching authority not inconsistent with the McFadden Act.233
C. Resolution by "Insured Deposit Transfers"
A second method by which the RTC resolves failed savings as-
sociations is by "insured deposit transfers. ' 23 4 An insured deposit
transfer is a type of insured deposit payoff in which, instead of
paying depositors their insured deposits directly, the RTC con-
tracts with a depository institution to act as the RTC's paying
agent. Using insurance payments it receives from the RTC, the
paying agent establishes a new deposit account for each of the
failed association's insured depositors. Those depositors are noti-
228. 911 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1990).
229. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 23-32-1202 (Supp. 1989).
230. The Eighth Circuit discussed, but declined to adopt, the holding of an earlier case in
which the Colorado district court concluded that, following an acquisition, section 1823(k)
permits existing savings association branches to be retained and operated as savings associa-
tion, but not bank, branches. 911 F.2d at 164. The Colorado court's analysis and holding
had limited applicability, said the Eighth Circuit, because the Colorado court construed the
statute and did not deal, as did the Eighth Circuit case, with the Override Rule itself. Id. at
172.
231. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1988).
232. 911 F.2d at 173-74.
233. Id. at 173.
234. Buyer's Guide, supra note 201, at 46,519.
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fled of such transfer and are given the opportunity to withdraw
their funds without penalty or to leave them on deposit in the new
institution. The RTC insurance payments are reduced, however, by
any "premium" paid by the paying agent for the accounts. The
paying agent agrees to pay the premium because it expects to ac-
quire the failed association's depositors as its own customers. As
with purchase and assumption transactions, purchasers of insured
deposits are selected by competitive bid.23 5
D. Factors Affecting the RTC's Disposition of Receivership
Assets
Even where the RTC is able to find an acquirer to engage in a
purchase and assumption transaction, a substantial portion of a
failed association's assets often remain under RTC control. These
may include: (1) marketable loans, servicing rights and securities;
(2) high risk or otherwise undesirable, but performing loans; (3)
real estate owned by the failed association; and (4) nonperforming
loans, including loans in foreclosure s.2 6 The RTC's objective is to
dispose of these assets as quickly as possible. The RTC does this
by a variety of methods, such as public and private auctions,231
securitization of assets for sale in the secondary mortgage market,
bulk sales,238 and individual sales of assets. Asset sale transactions
have proceeded slowly for a variety of reasons, including (1) lack of
incentives, such as loss protection and yield maintenance guaran-
tees on loans,3 9 (2) increased risk to the purchaser because of the
RTC's limited representations and warranties, 240 (3) cumbersome
235. Id.
236. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46577; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 41-44.
237. There have been some auctions but the largest, an international satellite auction of
$300 million of distressed shopping centers, office buildings and hotels, scheduled for the
Fall of 1990 was postponed twice and finally was canceled. Who Will Prosper From the
Savings and Loan Bailout?, 7 Real Est. Fin. Update, Jan. 1991, at 3.
238. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46577; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 43-44. In June, 1990, the RTC announced a plan to begin a program of bulk sales of
assets, including both real estate and other assets. This program is intended to attract insti-
tutional investors. See Zax & Ledig, The RTC and the Real Estate Industry, REAL EST. FIN.
J. 8, 11 (Fall 1990); RTC, Memorandum (July 9, 1990) (Recommendation by Oversight
Board President to Members of Oversight Board Regarding Bulk Sales of the RTC Assets).
239. See Zax & Ledig, supra note 238, at 9; see also Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 46576; Final Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 37.
240. See Statement of Policy on Representations and Warranties Offered in Mortgaging
and Servicing Rights Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. 23493 (1990); see also RTC, Memorandum (June 5,
1990) (Policy Recommendation for Representations and Warranties Offered in Mortgage
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procedures for appraising and marketing real estate, typified by
the RTC's affordable housing disposition program, (4) limited fi-
nancing options, and (5) lack of a robust real estate market due to
the recession. 4' In recent months, the RTC has attempted, as dis-
cussed below, to address some of these problems.
1. Lack of Loss Protection and Yield Maintenance Guarantees;
Limited Representations and Warranties
FIRREA does not permit the RTC to offer the loss protection
and yield maintenance guarantees that the FDIC and the FSLIC
were able to offer in the past to attract purchasers for the assets of
failed thrifts.2 42 The best inducement the RTC has been able to
offer purchasers is to permit them to return unsatisfactory assets
within twelve to eighteen months following the acquisition of such
assets.43 In addition, while the RTC originally refused to negotiate
the substantive terms of its transaction documents, it has relaxed
the restrictions on the types of representations and warranties that
it will give in the sale of mortgage loans and mortgage loan servic-
ing rights.244 The new policy, which became effective May 1, 1990,
is designed to help the RTC sell loans and servicing rights more
quickly and for a higher price. Under the new policy, the RTC ex-
tends to all purchasers the same representations and warranties it
once provided only to government sponsored purchasers such as
the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation. In mortgage loan sales, the RTC will
offer representations regarding its authority to sell the loans, as
well as representations regarding the characteristics of individual
loans. In both loan sales and mortgage servicing sales, certain rep-
resentations, relating primarily to loan documentation and quality,
provide for a five-year "discovery period. ' 245 During this five-year
period, the RTC will compensate buyers for actual losses incurred
over the life of the loan resulting from breaches of these represen-
Loan and Servicing Sales).
241. The RTC's National Monuments, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1991, at A12, col. 1.
242. See Zax & Ledig, supra note 238 at 9.
243. See id. at 9.
244. Statement of Policy on Representations and Warranties Offered in Mortgage Loan
and Servicing Rights Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. 23493 (1990). See RTC, Memorandum (June 5,
1990) (Policy Recommendation for Representations and Warranties Offered in Mortgage
Loan and Servicing Sales).
245. 55 Fed. Reg. at 23493.
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tations.2" In addition, the RTC in its corporate capacity will fur-
nish credit protection to buyers for certain losses on Veteran's Ad-
ministration loans.247 Given potential purchasers' reluctance to
accept representations from RTC conservatorships or receiver-
ships, the RTC either will provide the representations directly in
its corporate capacity or will guarantee, in its corporate capacity,'
the representations and warranties made by RTC conservatorships
or receiverships. 24s With respect to a breach by the RTC of a rep-
resentation or warranty made in connection with the sale of a
mortgage loan, the RTC, at its option, will repurchase the defec-
tive mortgage loan, substitute a similar loan for the defective loan,
or indemnify the holder of the defective loan for any loss resulting
upon foreclosure of such loan.249 In connection with the breach of a
representation or warranty with respect to the sale of mortgage
servicing rights, the RTC will not repurchase any defective loan,
but will compensate the purchaser for actual losses incurred on
such loan.250
2. Determination of Price Based Upon Appraisal
Section 501(b)(12)(D)(ii) of FIRREA charges the RTC with es-
tablishing "an appraisal or other valuation method for determining
the market value of real property" in distressed areas.2 51 The Act
further requires that real estate be sold for at least 95% of market




249. See RTC, Memorandum. (June 5, 1990) (Policy Recommendation for Representa-
tions and Warranties Offered in Mortgage Loan and Servicing Sales). On June 8, 1990, the
RTC published a policy statement in the Federal Register based upon the June 5, 1990
recommendations. 55 Fed. Reg. 23493. This policy statement is significantly less detailed
than the June 5, 1990 recommendations as to the remedies available for breaches of repre-
sentations and warranties made or guaranteed by the RTC.
250. See RTC, Memorandum (June 5, 1990) (Policy Recommendation for Representa-
tions and Warranties Offered in Mortgage Loan and Servicing Sales); see also supra note
249.
251. FIRREA, supra note 2, at § 501(b)(12)(D)(ii) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §
1441a(b)(12)(D)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990)). "Market value" is defined as "the most prob-
able price which a property should bring in a competitive and open market if-(I) all condi-
tions requisite to a fair sale are present, (11) the buyer and seller are acting prudently and
are knowledgeable, and (III) the price is not affected by any undue stimulus." 12 U.S.C.A. §
1441a(b)(12)(E)(iv) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
252. Id. § 1441a(b)(12)(E)(i). The Act designates six states as distressed areas: Arkansas,
Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas. Id. § 1441a(b)(12)(E)(iii). The
RTC apparently may sell real estate in non-distressed areas for no less than 90% of market
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not sold within six months of active marketing (or four months in
the case of single family properties) may be reduced if no offers
have been received or if the offers received are significantly lower
than the appraised value of the property. Market value is generally
based upon an appraisal provided by an independent appraiser,
adjusted for holding and other verifiable costs. 253 If it is necessary
to reduce the asking price for a particular property, the RTC may
rely upon broker's opinions as to market conditions as a justifica-
tion for price reductions.
3. Affordable Housing Disposition Program
The Act requires the RTC to dispose of its acquired property as
expeditiously as possible without causing any dislocation in the lo-
cal market.2 54 Yet, the Act places restrictions on the RTC's ability
to dispose of certain single-family and multifamily properties to
ensure that these properties remain available to low and middle
income families or individuals.
The Act requires that a single-family residence appraised for
$67,500 or less must be offered for sale for ninety days exclusively
to individuals who intend to occupy the dwelling as their principal
residence and whose adjusted income is less than 115% of the
area's median income or to public agencies or nonprofit organiza-
tions that agree to rent the property only to lower-income families.
If there are no purchasers who satisfy these criteria, the property
can be actively marketed to the public.255
value. Zax, Doing Deals with the RTC, URBAN LAND 7, 8 (July 1990).
253. In reviewing the savings and loan crisis, Congress determined that one of the abuses
that had to be avoided in the future was the manner in which real estate appraisals were
handled in the past. Congress felt that associations made real estate loans in the past based,
in part, upon inflated appraisals. Saft, The Basics of FIRREA and the Resolution Trust
Corporation, REAL EST. FIN. J. 48, 54-55 (Winter 1991). FIRREA mandates the establish-
ment of uniform appraisal standards by all federal regulatory agencies. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 3339-
42 (West 1989). FIRREA also requires states to develop licensing requirements so that all
licensed appraisers are properly qualified. Id. § 3338. Commencing July 1, 1991, appraisals
for all federally regulated real estate transactions must be prepared by individuals who are
properly licensed or certified. Id. § 3348(a)(1). The term "federally regulated real estate
transaction" generally includes any real estate transaction (including sales, purchases,
leases, financings, or other investments in real property) in which the RTC, any insured
depository institution, or any federal regulatory agency is involved. Id. §§ 3350(4), 3350 (5);
see also Salt, supra, at 55.
254. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(b)(3)(C)(ii) (West Cum. Supp. 1990); see also Salt, supra note
253, at 55.
255. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441a(c)(2), 1441a(c)(9)(D) (West Cune. Supp. 1990); see also Salt,
supra note 253, at 55. The term "lower-income families" means families and individuals
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The sale of certain lower value multifamily property also is sub-
ject to restrictions. Such multifamily property must first be offered
for sale for ninety days to purchasers who will accept a deed re-
striction that no less than 20% of the units be made available for
occupancy by very-low income families and another 15% of the
units be made available for occupancy for lower-income families. 256
In order to qualify to purchase one or more eligible single-family
properties, a public agency or nonprofit organization must certify
to the RTC that it will make the property available for occupancy
by, and thereafter maintain it as affordable housing for, lower-in-
come families, or make the property available for purchase by
lower-income families. To accomplish this, the RTC's conveyanc-
ing deeds for applicable single-family properties include this re-
striction (with the proviso that such properties may subsequently
be sold to lower-income families without further restriction). In ad-
dition, the RTC is required to include a restriction in the convey-
ancing deeds for applicable multifamily properties that such
properties be maintained as available and affordable housing for
low-income families for the remainder of their useful lives.257
The RTC's failure to comply with these requirements may not
be used by any person to attack or defeat title once it is conveyed
by the RTC.2 s However, the low income occupancy requirements
may be judicially enforced by affected low-income families. It is
unclear what the result would be if a purchaser of an eligible low-
income property took title without the required deed restriction.
Although the purchaser is seemingly protected from losing title to
the property, the low-income occupancy provisions may neverthe-
less be specifically enforceable against any purchaser who acquires
title to the property free of the restriction. In addition, it is possi-
ble that such provisions may be enforced against subsequent pur-
chasers who acquire title without notice of the low-income status
of the property.
whose incomes do not exceed 80% of area median income, as defined under 42 U.S.C. §
1437a(b)(2) and as determined by the Secretary of HUD, with adjustment for family size. 12
U.S.C.A. § 1441a(c)(9)(G) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
256. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1441a(c)(2)(B), 1441a(c)(2)(D) (West Cum. Supp. 1990). The term
"very low-income families" means families and individuals whose incomes do not exceed
50% of area median income, as defined under 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(2) and as determined by
the Secretary of HUD, with adjustment for family size. Id. § 1441a(c)(9).
257. See Affordable Housing Disposition Program, 55 Fed. Reg. 35564, 35571, 35573
(1990) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1609.7(a)(5) and (b)(9)).
258. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1441a(c)(11)(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1990).
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4. Financing Options Offered by the RTC
The RTC Oversight Board's original strategic plan provided for
only limited financing to purchasers of real estate assets held by
the RTC.25 On March 8, 1990, the Board adopted policies which
allow the RTC to loan purchasers up to 85% of the applicable
purchase price provided that the RTC determines that it will be
able to sell such loans on a nonrecourse basis within a reasonable
period of time through private placements, public offerings or loan
securitization programs and that the present value return to the
RTC on such properties with RTC financing exceeds any existing
cash offers.260 In determining the net present value return for
which it has provided financing, the RTC considers the purchase
price, the value of any concessionary financing terms, the value of
any avoided holding costs, any enhanced asset value resulting from
the purchaser's financial capabilities and any enhanced liquidity
resulting from conversion of a real estate asset into a performing
asset.2 61
In order to provide such financing, the RTC must receive a first
lien on the real estate asset, which lien may not be subordinated. 82
If private sector lenders are unwilling to finance a proposed
purchase on terms as favorable to the purchaser as those offered
by the RTC, the RTC will view its loan as a subsidy that it will
expect to recover through a higher purchase price. 6 3 The aggregate
principal amount of such financing loans that the RTC currently
may hold at any one time under this program is $7 billion. 64
This $7 billion of financing includes financing for bulk sales of
certain RTC assets.265 In bulk sales, the RTC assembles pools of
receivership assets, including commercial loans (both performing
and nonperforming), commercial properties, multifamily residen-
tial loans (both performing and nonperforming) and multifamily
residential properties. 26 6 Once the pool of assets is assembled, the
259. See Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46578; Final Strategic Plan, supra
note 200, at 45.
260. RTC, Policy Statement No. 13, at 2 (Mar. 8, 1990).
261. Id.
262. RTC, How to Buy Real Estate 3 (Apr. 1990) (RTC Pamphlet).
263. Proposed Strategic Plan, supra note 200, at 46578; Final Strategic Plan, supra note
200, at 45.
264. Morse, New RTC Policy Offers Liberalized Seller Financing, Corridor Real Est. J.,
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RTC contracts with independent firms to review the assets in-
cluded in the pool and to establish an Estimated Recovery Value
("ERV") for the pool.28 7 The RTC then offers the pool for sale
through competitive bidding, at a modest discount based on the
reduction in the RTC's sales costs per unit. The highest bidder is
permitted to conduct its own limited asset review. Any RTC fi-
nancing provided in connection with the sale of the pool will be
repaid through collections from the asset pool over the term of the
loan. Once the RTC loan is repaid and the ERV on the asset pool
is achieved, the RTC will continue to receive a portion of any addi-
tional recoveries on the pool, even though the owner of those assets
will receive a majority of such recoveries.""
V. CONCLUSION
The primary objectives of the Act include the establishment of a
new federal regulator, the OTS, for savings associations and the
creation of the RTC to resolve failed savings associations. The re-
ceivership/conservatorship process described in this article results
from the interpretation by the OTS and the RTC of the powers
granted them by FIRREA. The process will change as the OTS
and the RTC develop new or different policies and procedures to.
implement those powers and to respond to new issues that arise in
the receivership/conservatorship process. Consequently, the ulti-
mate effect of the Act on the savings association industry remains
to be determined.
The receivership/conservatorship process begins with a decision
by the OTS to place a failed savings association into receivership
or conservatorship. Ideally, the process ends when the RTC ar-
ranges for the purchase of most of the assets, and the assumption
of the deposit and certain other liabilities, of the failed savings as-
sociation by another depository institution or its holding company.
Many times, however, the RTC is unable to find a buyer for a
failed savings association and, whether or not it finds such a buyer,
the RTC generally will be left with the assets that are not saleable.
Thus, in addition to the large number of failed associations that it
is charged with resolving, the RTC must find an efficient and effec-
267. RTC, Presentation (July 24, 1990) (Large Bulk Sales).
268. Id. at 5.
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tive method for disposing of the sizeable volume of assets it has
accumulated from failed associations. Until it does, the RTC's task
will not have been accomplished.
